

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, June 8, 1858.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Ross, R.E., of his inquiry into the circumstances attending the accident which occurred on the 19th ultimo to an express train at the Appley Bridge station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

My Lords trust that the directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company will adopt, without delay, the recommendations suggested by the inspecting officer.

I am, &amp;c.

DOUGLAS GALTON,

*The Secretary to the  
Lancashire and Yorkshire  
Railway Company.*

Captain, R.E.

SIR, *Manchester, May 25, 1858.*

IN obedience to your instructions, I have this day inspected the scene of the accident to the 4.50 express train from Manchester to Southport, which occurred on the 19th instant; and I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that there is in my opinion no doubt as to the cause of the accident.

The train consisted of one of the six-wheel engines ordinarily employed by the Lancashire and Yorkshire Company, with outside cylinders, and six feet driving wheels; of a tender and break van, and of two first and two second class passenger carriages. It had left Wigan at about its proper time (5h. 29m.), and was proceeding at its usual reduced speed of 13½ miles an hour round the curve which leads to Appley Bridge station, when, after passing over an under bridge within a few hundred yards of the latter, the engine suddenly left the line to (the right) the outside of the curve, dragging with it the tender and carriages.

The line is single, and the spot where this took place was at a three-throw switch, dangerously placed at the further side, and within five or six feet of the under bridge.

The points were facing points to trains proceeding in the direction in which the train was travelling, and led to a siding on either side of the line.

It appeared in evidence that the station porter was, in the performance of his duty, holding the levers of these points when the engine was passing, and that he continued to hold them after the engine mounted the rail and till the carriages had passed; also that the switch rail of the main line was locked prior to the accident.

The injured rails, including the switch points, had been replaced before I visited the spot; but this is of the less importance as regards my inquiry, they having been relaid precisely in their former position, and in my opinion the position of the three-throw switch is quite sufficient to account for the accident.

The curve I have alluded to has a radius of perhaps 20 or 25 chains, and the rails are laid down following this curve to within a few feet of the

bridge. They are carried in a straight line over the bridge (which is broad enough for a double line), and then there is a sharp change again of direction to that of the curve at the three-throw switch, the latter being at the summit of a slightly ascending gradient in either direction.

My astonishment is that an accident should not have occurred before by a train leaving the line at this point, and I consider that one may at any time be expected to happen to trains passing from Wigan to Southport while the arrangement continues as at present.

I have reason to suppose that the engine did not mount the rail at the point of the switch. I understand that it was little injured, though the bolt and padlock by which it was fastened were torn from it, and the porter had no difficulty in continuing to hold the lever, which could hardly have been the case had the point of the switch met the engine.

It appears certain, however, that the engine mounted the rail before reaching the heel of the switch, and, dropping between it and the rail, forced off the padlock and bolt. It then proceeded, followed by the tender, carriages, and break van, for about 80 feet, where it turned over on its right side, on to the outer siding, the rails of which, with those of the main line, were torn up for that distance, the carriages and tender remaining on their wheels in their proper order.

The suggestions that I would offer for the safety of the traffic at this place are as follows:—

To remove the left facing point of the three-throw switch.

To unite that siding with a siding (about 100 yards on the Wigan side of the bridge) leading from Mr. Scarisbrick's chemical works; and to connect this prolonged siding with the main line at about the spot where Mr. Scarisbrick's siding now enters it.

Finally, the straight line of rail across the bridge to be brought gradually into the general curve towards Appley Bridge station, and the greatest precaution to be used in connecting the right siding with the main line.

I gathered from the engineer in charge of the line, that he had been unwilling to improve the curve by taking advantage of the width of the bridge, under the idea that the Lancashire and Yorkshire company would shortly complete their second line of rails from Wigan to Southport.

I believe that some arrangement of the kind I have suggested, which would remove one facing point, and improve the curve, is absolutely essential to the safety of the traffic, whatever the ultimate intentions of the directors of the company may be; and I venture to observe, should I have been rightly informed, that this question of doubling the line is on other grounds under their consideration, that, as facing points have been a fertile cause of accident, they may perhaps be disposed to give some weight to the fact that the liability to accidents of this class is almost removed by a double line.

I have, &amp;c.

*Captain Galton, R.E.,  
&c.*

*GEORGE ROSS,  
Captain, R.E.*

## LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, June 23, 1858.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the report which they have received from Lieut.-Colonel Yolland, R.E., of his inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that

occurred on the 10th ultimo to an express train near Nuneaton station on the Trent Valley section of the London and North-Western Railway.

My Lords trust that the remarks of the inspecting officer on the amount of break power which should be supplied in express trains will be carefully considered by the directors.