

Although the responsibility for this accident must rest on driver Haines, there is one point to which, in justice to him, as well as for other reasons, attention must be called. The total length of platform available for this train was seven hundred and sixty feet, but, for reasons stated above, it was necessary for it to be brought to a stand with its rear vehicle clear of the locking bar of the points leading to the turn-table, and the end of this locking bar is situated at a distance of seven hundred and fifty-one feet from the buffer stops; the length of the train was seven hundred and twenty-five feet, so that it was necessary that the engine should be brought to a stand within twenty-six feet of the buffer stops. This is a small margin, and it calls for very careful handling on the part of a driver to bring a heavy train to rest within such narrow limits. If trains of this length are to be run into this station, this accident clearly points to the desirability of an increase in the length of the platforms, and the attention of both Companies should be drawn to this matter.

I have, &c.,
P. G. VON DONOP,
Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.

The Assistant Secretary,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

APPENDIX.

DAMAGE TO ROLLING STOCK.

Engine No. 66.—Two steps on back of bunker bent; four buffer sockets slightly damaged; leading buffer beam badly bent in right-hand corner; buffer beam gusset bent and all rivets of gusset sheared.

No. 70, brake-carriage.—Three buffers bent and one broken; body stop slightly bent; one bogie bolster lifted out of spring bed and bolts bent; one cell box strap bent; and four buffer blocks slightly damaged.

No. 278, third class.—Four buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; one door ventilator, one luggage rack bracket, one door light and partition facia glass broken.

No. 268, third class.—Four buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; steam heating pipe slightly shifted.

No. 271, third class.—Four buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; four bogie bolster bolts bent; three quarter lights, one door light and three partition facia glasses broken.

No. 287, third class.—Four buffer blocks

slightly damaged paint; three quarter lights, one door light and three partition facia glasses broken.

No. 216, six-wheel third class.—Four buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; three quarter lights broken.

No. 38, composite.—Four buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; two quarter lights, four partition facia glasses broken; two bolster bolts bent.

No. 68, first class.—Two buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; three bogie bolster bolts broken, and one bent.

No. 67, first class.—Two buffer blocks slightly damaged paint; two bogie bolster bolts slightly bent.

No. 68, brake-carriage.—One partition facia glass broken.

DAMAGE TO BUFFER STOPS.

One cylinder head broken; two striking plates broken; two brass bushing rings bent.

Printed copies of the above Report were sent to the Great Eastern, and London, Tilbury and Southend Railway Companies on the 29th February.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade (Railway Department),
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.

SIR,

25th March, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of the 12th March, the result of my inquiry into the causes of the collision which occurred on the 8th March, between two light engines and a goods train near Bury on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

In this case, as the 1.30 a.m. Royton to Church goods train was setting back from the up connecting line to the down main line at Bury Loop Junction signal-box, it was

run into in the rear by two light engines travelling from Broadfield to Bury on the down main line.

The guard of the goods train was fatally injured, and the drivers and firemen of the light engines, and also a driver who was riding on the leading light engine as a passenger, were injured.

The five rear vehicles of the goods train were derailed, and three thrown down the embankment.

The goods train consisted of a six-wheels-coupled goods tender engine fitted with the automatic vacuum brake working blocks on all wheels of the engine and tender, and of 64 waggons and a brake van.

Engine 256, the leading light engine, was a six-wheels-coupled saddle tank engine fitted with the steam brake working blocks on all six wheels, and engine No. 805, the second light engine, was a similar engine, but fitted with the automatic vacuum brake working blocks on all six wheels.

The collision occurred at about 5.35 a.m. on a clear morning, but it was still dark at the time.

Details of damage to rolling stock and permanent way are given in the Appendix.

Description.

There is a single pair of lines between Heap Bridge Junction and Bury Loop Junction, running east and west, the down line being on the south side of the up line.

The distance between the two signal-boxes is 1,225 yards, and there is an intermediate signal-box, viz., Gigg Mills siding, 388 yards east of Bury Loop signal-box, but this was switched out at the time of the collision.

The facing points in the down line at Bury Loop Junction leading to the connecting line to Radcliffe are 150 yards east of the signal-box, and the facing points in the down line where it divides into the down platform and down through lines to Knowsley Street Station are opposite the signal-box, but the only line concerned in this case is the down line and the connecting line to Radcliffe in continuation of it.

There are home signals close by Bury Loop Junction signal-box, and outer home signals 223 yards east of the home signals.

The point of collision was 458 yards east of Bury Loop Junction signal-box and 70 yards east of Gigg Mills siding signal-box.

The gradient of the down line on which the light engines were travelling is 1 in 85 falling from Heap Bridge Junction to almost the point of collision and is then 1 in 106, and it is quite straight for more than 500 yards back from the point of collision.

At Heap Bridge Junction the home signal is 25 yards east of the signal-box, and the starting signal 360 yards west of the signal-box.

Evidence.

S. E. Tattersall states: I entered the service in July, 1901, and have been a signalman eight and a half years, and at Heap Bridge nearly two years. I commenced duty on March 7th at 10 p.m. to work until 6 a.m. on the 8th, after having finished duty at 6 a.m. the previous day. I received the "Is line clear" signal from Broadfield for the 1.30 a.m. Royton Junction to Church goods train at 4.57 a.m., acknowledged it at the same time, and also received the "Train entering section" signal at the same time. The train passed my box at 5.16 a.m. It was acknowledged by Loop Junction Box at 5.4 a.m. and I received the "Train out of section" signal at 5.23 a.m. I received the circuit for the 5.8 a.m. Rochdale to Bolton passenger train at 5.12 and it was offered to me at 5.16 a.m. and I accepted it at the same time. I received the "Train entering section" signal at 5.21 a.m. and the train passed me at 5.25 a.m. It was acknowledged by Loop Junction box at 5.23 a.m. and I gave the "Train out of section" signal to Broadfield at 5.25 a.m., and received the "Train out of section" signal from Loop Junction at 5.26 a.m. I received the "Is line clear" signal from Broadfield for two light engines at 5.25 a.m., at which time they were acknowledged, and I also received "Train entering section" signal at the same time. I offered the

two engines to Bury Loop Junction at 5.26. I gave "Entering section" signal for them at 5.32. They were accepted by Loop Junction box at 5.27 a.m. I gave the "Train out of section" signal for them to Broadfield at 5.32 a.m. The light engines were offered by me to Loop Junction at 5.26 a.m., but they were not accepted until 5.27 a.m. I did not send the "Is line clear" signal a second time. When I offered the two light engines to Loop Junction I looked at the indicator, and it was then in the normal position, and when I offered the engines the signalman at Loop Junction repeated the signal distinctly and turned the needle to "Line clear." As the two light engines approached my home signal I went to the block instrument to give the "Train entering section" signal, and I then noticed that since I had offered the engines the train indicator had been altered to "Train on line." I then gave the "Train entering section" signal to Loop Junction box, and followed this by the "Bank engine in rear of train" signal. I then received one long beat on the bell and I went to the telephone, when signalman Yates, at Bury Loop Junction box, said to me "I have blocked back," and immediately realising that something was wrong I put my starting signal to danger, but on looking out I saw the engines had already passed it by a

few yards. After I noticed that the engines had passed the starting signal I sent the "Train running away on right line" signal at 5.33 a.m., and it was acknowledged at once by repetition 4-5-5. I am certain that after I had offered the light engines to Loop Junction, the block indicator stood at "Line clear," but when I went to the instrument to give "Train entering section" signal it had then gone to "Train on line." Although I knew that the block instrument ought to have indicated "Line clear," I did not take any action to stop the engines in order to ascertain why the needle had been altered, as, having had the engines accepted by Loop Junction, I did not realise that there was any obstruction. It has been the custom for the signalman at Loop Junction, whenever a train has been drawn on to the connecting line and has had to set back on to the main line, in addition to giving the prescribed signal, to verbally inform us on the telephone when this was being done, but in this instance the information was not telephoned to me.

D. Yates states: I entered the service in September, 1880, and have been a signalman for 20 years and at Bury Loop Junction 14 years. I commenced duty on March 7th at 10 p.m. to work until 6 a.m. the following day, having previously finished duty at 10 p.m. on March 6th. I received the "Is line clear" signal for the 1.30 a.m. Royton Junction to Church goods train, which consisted of 64 waggons and a brake van, from Heap Bridge Junction box at 5.5 a.m., and I acknowledged it at the same time. I received the "Train entering section" signal at 5.16 a.m., and the train arrived at 5.19 a.m., and was drawn on to the connecting line, after being accepted by Bury East box at 5.16 a.m. It came to a stand with the brake van opposite my box. I gave "Out of section" signal for it to Heap Bridge Junction at 5.25 a.m. The train was drawn on to the connecting line to give a path to the 5.8 a.m. Rochdale to Bolton passenger train. At 5.25 I received "Is line clear" for the passenger train and acknowledged it at the same time. I received "Entering section" signal at 5.27 and it passed me at 5.28, when I gave "Train out of section" signal for it to Heap Bridge Junction, and a light engine was then offered to me, which I did not accept. I then asked Bury East on the telephone if they were in a position to accept the Church goods train as I knew that the 2.30 a.m. Rochdale to Bolton goods train was on the down through line, and the signalman at Bury East replied "Yes; get the train off." I then gave the "Call attention" signal to Heap Bridge which was acknowledged by one beat, and afterwards the "Blocking back outside home signal," 3-3, at 5.29 a.m., which was acknowledged by repetition. Immediately the blocking back signal had been acknowledged by Heap Bridge I put the block indicator to "Train on line." It was standing previously in the vertical position, and I never put it to the "Line clear" position. I then arranged for the Royton Junction to Church train to set back off the connecting line. This took three or four minutes at most. At 5.36 a.m. I received two beats on the block bell from Heap Bridge Junction, followed immediately by 2-2, and at once concluded there was something wrong. I therefore went to the telephone and called up Heap Bridge by a long beat on the bell and asked him what was to do, and signalman Tattersall replied "The two engines." I said "How does my needle stand?" He said "Train on line." I said "I have blocked back." Immediately afterwards I got the run-away signal (4-5-5) from Heap Bridge Junction.

I did not acknowledge this signal by repetition but sent the one long beat. I quickly went to the cabin door and called out to the driver who had then set back on the down main line beyond my box, and he continued to set back a further distance of about, as near as I can judge, 14 waggon lengths. The collision then occurred. I had not time to get my hand lamp to show the danger signal to the driver of the Church train. I have not booked the "Train entering section" signal for the engines, as I was so upset seeing the goods train was then setting back in the path of the approaching engines. When I received the "Train entering section" signal for the light engines which I had not accepted I did not give the "Obstruction danger" signal to Heap Bridge Junction box, firstly, because I thought the "Blocking back" signal was tantamount to the same thing, and, secondly, because I endeavoured to ascertain from Heap Bridge Junction why the two beats had been sent to me, and I then went to the cabin door with the object of calling the attention of the driver of the Royton Junction to Church train to stop the train from setting back farther. It has been my practice to inform the signalman at Heap Bridge Junction on the telephone, in addition to giving the prescribed signal, when trains have been set back off the connecting line on to the down main line, but on this occasion I omitted to do so. This is done when Gigg Mills siding box is open so as to ensure the blocking back signal being sent to Heap Bridge Junction as the sections are short ones. I have had trains slacken on account of drivers backing out on to the up line with the three red lights on the brake van not obscured, thinking that the train was on the down line and not on the up line. When the lamps have not been changed when setting back I have drawn the train men's attention to it, but nobody else's.

H. N. Ward states: I have been nine years as driver in the Company's service. I came on duty at 12.15 a.m. on the 8th March for a ten hours turn of duty, having left duty 12 hours previously. I was working the 1.30 a.m. goods train from Royton Junction to Church with engine No. 320, which was a six-wheels-coupled goods tender engine. The train consisted of 64 waggons and guard's brake. The deceased guard joined the train when it had been drawn on to the Bury loop line from the down line. This would be about 5.20 a.m. He relieved an Aintree guard. We were drawn into the Bury loop to allow a passenger train from Rochdale to Bolton to pass on the main line. When deceased came on duty he did not report to me. As he passed my engine he asked me what train I was, I presume in order to get to know whether it was his train. I remained in the Bury loop from 5.15 a.m. to about 5.31 a.m. At about 5.31 a.m. I got a signal from the ground staff, I do not know who the actual man was who gave it to me, to set my train back. That would mean setting back 400 or 500 yards. I could not see the Bury loop cabin when instructed to set back. I commenced to set the train back and I had just got past the Bury loop cabin when I felt we had come in contact with something. I did not see the pointsman as I passed his cabin. Immediately afterwards I sent my fireman in to the Bury loop cabin to inform the pointsman of the collision. I did not know the nature of the collision at this time. I, personally, did not see the pointsman at Bury loop cabin at all, nor did I see him give any signal. We were going 5 to 10 miles per hour at the time of the collision. My train was a loaded one. The connecting line is almost level. I was between the pointsman's cabin and the bridge

when the collision took place. We were about 50 yards from getting altogether on to the main line when the collision took place.

John Kelly states: I was driver Ward's fireman on engine No. 320, and worked the same hours as he did. We had got about 10 yards past the Bury loop cabin when I felt that we had come into collision with something. The collision stopped the train. After the collision I went to Bury loop cabin and there saw David Yates, the pointsman, and said to him "We have had a collision, what have we come into contact with?" He replied that we had come into contact with two light engines which had run through the block. We were travelling about eight miles per hour when we struck the light engines.

Thomas Rawson states: I have been 17 years in the Company's service, nine as an acting driver. I was coming from Castleton with a light engine, No. 256, and at Broadfield I hooked on to another light engine, No. 805, and we left there together at 5.28 a.m. The signals were off for us approaching Heap Bridge Junction, as were also those for Gigg Mills. When I passed Heap Bridge Junction cabin, I saw the signalman, who, I think, was writing at his desk. I saw the three red lights on the rear of the brake van of the goods train when just past the viaduct over the river, and I thought at first that they were on the up line, as sometimes trains back out on to the up line without the tail and side lights being obscured. We were not more than 30 yards away, I think, when I saw that they were on the down line. I immediately put the brake on and reversed the engine, and also opened the alarm whistle and sand valve, but we at once ran into the brake van. We were running I should think at about 30 miles an hour coming down the bank, and the brakes had not time to take effect. Both engines were running bunker first. My engine was a six-wheels-coupled saddle tank engine. I went to Bury Loop Junction cabin after the collision and told the signalman Yates that we had been let into a goods train, and he said some-

thing about the block needles, but I said I did not understand them.

G. Waring states: I have been 15 months in the Company's employment, and an acting fireman. I was working with driver Rawson on locomotive No. 256 on Friday morning, March 8th. The first thing I knew of there being anything wrong before the collision was the driver shouting out. On looking up, I saw two red lights ahead of us. The driver reversed the engine and gave her steam. Just before the collision occurred I got on to the step and rolled off when it happened. There were two other men riding as passengers on the engine at the time.

Samuel Roby states: I have been 22 years in the employ of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company. I was doing bank work between Bury and Castleton on Friday morning, March 8th, in charge of engine No. 805. Engine No. 256 coupled on to our engine at Broadfield on the return journey. Engine No. 256 was at the front, bunker first. We left Broadfield at about 5.28 a.m., the down line signals all being off. The signals were all off at Heap Bridge cabin. We were travelling at 15 to 20 miles per hour when approaching Gigg Mills siding. After we had passed the seven arches engine No. 256 tooted with the whistle and I put on the brake and reversed my engine. The next instant we evidently ran into something. I was banged about and dazed for a few seconds before I could get off the engine, and when I did so I saw the goods train on the line in front of engine No. 256. The back of the brake was in contact with the bunker end of engine No. 256. From my experience I should say it is possible, when over the arches, for a driver on the down line to think that a train near Alfred Street Bridge on the up main line is on the down main line in front of him. My engine was a six-wheels-coupled saddle tank engine running bunker first. I came on duty at 2.15 a.m. on the 8th for a 10-hour term, having left duty at 2.40 p.m. on the 7th.

Conclusion.

The cause of this collision was due to the two light engines being admitted into the section between Heap Bridge Junction and Bury Loop Junction, while that section was occupied by the goods train setting back outside the outer home signals of the latter box.

It will be seen from the evidence of the two signalmen concerned, that there is a dispute as to the bell signals exchanged between the two cabins regarding the light engines. The goods train had arrived at Bury Loop Junction at 5.19 a.m., and was drawn forward on to the connecting line, in order to clear the road for the 5.8 a.m. Rochdale to Bolton passenger train. This latter train passed the Bury Loop Junction signal-box at 5.28 a.m., and the usual "Out of section" signal was sent to the Heap Bridge junction box. Up to this point the working was normal. After this, according to signalman Tattersall at Heap Bridge junction box, he offered two light engines to Bury Loop Junction at 5.26, but they were not at once accepted; but he states that he is positive they were accepted at 5.27 a.m., and he did not send "Is line clear" signal a second time. He is also positive that when he offered the two light engines to Bury Loop Junction, the indicator of his block instrument was in the normal position, and that when the engines were accepted by signalman Yates at Bury Loop Junction, the latter repeated the signal distinctly, and turned the needle to the "Line clear" position. Signalman Tattersall further states that as the two light engines approached his home signal, he went to the block instrument to give the "Train entering section" signal to Bury Loop Junction, and he then noticed that since the engines had been accepted, the indicator had been altered to "Train on line" position. In spite of this, he gave the "Train entering section" signal for the light engines, followed by the signal "Bank

engine in rear of train," as there were two engines; this, he states, was at 5.32 a.m. As soon as he had sent the "Train entering section" signal, Tattersall states that he received one long beat on the bell; so he went to the telephone, and signalman Yates said to him "I have blocked back." Realising that something was wrong, he then put his starting signal to danger, but on looking out he saw that the engines had already passed that signal. He then sent the "Train running away on right line" signal, at 5.33 a.m., and this he states was acknowledged at once by repetition, 4-5-5, and not by one long beat. Tattersall had lowered his signals for the light engines at 5.27, when he says they were accepted by the Bury Loop junction box.

Signalman Yates at Bury Loop junction signal-box on the other hand states that, as soon as the passenger train had passed him at 5.28 a.m., he gave "Train out of section" signal for it to Heap Bridge Junction, and that then the light engines were offered to him from that box, which he did not accept. He states that he then asked the signalman at Bury East signal-box, on the telephone, if he was in a position to accept the Church goods train, and he replied "Yes." He says he then gave the "Call attention" signal to Heap Bridge Junction, which was acknowledged by one beat, and afterwards he gave the "Blocking back outside home signal," 3-3, to that box, which was acknowledged by repetition; this was at 5.29 a.m. He then put the block indicator to "Train on line" position. He states that it was standing previously in the normal position, and that he had never placed it to "Line clear" position after the passing of the passenger train. Yates says that he then arranged for the Church goods train to set back from the connecting line to the down main line, ready to go forward. This took three or four minutes at the outside, and the train commenced to set back. Yates then says that at 5.36, he received two beats on the block bell, followed immediately by 2-2, the "Entering section" signal for the light engines, and he at once concluded there was something wrong. He therefore went to the telephone, giving one long beat on the bell of the block instrument, to call up Heap Bridge to see what was happening, and Tattersall replied "The two light engines." Yates then said "How does my needle stand?" and Tattersall replied "Train on line." Yates then said "I have blocked back." Immediately afterwards Yates says he got the run-away signal 4-5-5, and that he did not acknowledge this by repetition, but by one long beat. Yates says he then went to the cabin door to call out to the driver of the goods train, but he had then set back on to the down main line beyond his box, and he could not get his attention; and the collision occurred when he had set back a short distance further.

Driver Ward of the goods train states that, when ordered to set back from the connecting line to the down main line, he did so at a speed of from 5 to 10 miles an hour, and he had just got past the Bury Loop Junction signal-box when he felt that he had run into something. It was not possible for him to have seen the light engines approaching the rear of his train.

Driver Rawson, who was in charge of the light engine, says he first caught sight of the three red lights on the rear of the brake van of the goods train when just past the viaduct over the river Roch, that is about 200 yards from the point of collision. He states he at first thought the lights were on a train on the up line, and that he was quite close up to them before he realised that they were on the down line. He immediately put on the brake and reversed the engine, opening the whistle and the sand valve, but as he was running at a speed of about 30 miles an hour down the falling gradient of 1 in 85, the brakes had very little effect on the speed of the train before the collision occurred.

Driver Roby of the second light engine also applied his brakes and reversed when he heard driver Rawson whistle.

The responsibility for this accident must lie between the two signalmen, but their respective statements regarding the signalling of the light engines and the "blocking back" signal are so contradictory, that it is impossible to form any opinion as to what really happened. Both had been on duty for seven and a half hours at the time of the collision, and the tour of duty of each man was eight hours. Signalman Tattersall, at Heap Bridge Junction, admits that when he went to give the "Train entering section" signal for the light engines as they approached his box the indicator of the block instrument stood at "Train on line" instead of "Line clear" as it should have done, and that in spite of this he took no action to stop the engines by placing his signals to danger, but sent the "Train entering section" signal for them, although he should have known from the position of the indicator of the block instrument that the signalman at Bury Loop Junction was evidently under the impression that there was something in the section, even if the "blocking back" signal had not been sent, as the latter states was the case. The starting signal is 360 yards ahead of this signal-box, and could have been placed to danger while the

engines were passing the signal box. Signalman Yates admits that he did not, according to the usual practice, inform the signalman at Heap Bridge Junction by telephone that the goods train was going to set back off the connecting line outside the outer home signals of the down main line, in addition to giving the blocking back signal. There is no rule that this message should be sent, but it is the practice to do so when Gigg Mills siding box is closed. This omission seems to have led signalman Tattersall to think there was no obstruction on the down line, although the indicator of the block instrument was standing at the "Train on line" position.

With regard to driver Rawson, I certainly think he could have seen the three red lights on the brake van ahead of him sooner than he did, if he had been on the lookout. The line is quite straight for 500 yards back from the point of collision and for more than 200 yards beyond it. If the speed of the goods train setting back was as stated from 5 to 10 miles an hour, it would take three-quarters of a minute to set back from the point where the red lights should have been plainly visible to the point of collision; and if driver Rawson was running at 30 miles an hour, he should have had a clear view of the red lights for quite 30 seconds before colliding with the goods train. There were a relief driver and fireman riding on his engine, which may have distracted his attention. As regards his statement that he thought at first that the red lights were on the up line and not on the down line on which he was running, it would appear from his evidence, and from that of driver Roby and signalman Yates, that sometimes trains set back from the up sidings to the up line without the tail light being removed and the side lights reversed or obscured, as laid down by Rule 182 (d), and that sometimes trains have been checked through the drivers thinking the red lights were on the down line. In this case driver Rawson should have applied his brakes as soon as ever he saw the red lights, and as the line is quite straight, there is no reason why he should have thought the lights were on the up line and not on the down.

I have, &c.,
E. DRUITT,
Lt.-Col.

The Assistant Secretary,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

APPENDIX.

Damage to Permanent Way.

11 sleepers, 12 8-inch chairs, 2 fishbolts broken; 80 yards of road forced out of line.

Damage to Rolling Stock.

Engine 256.—Bufferplate badly bent at bunker end; two buffers broken at bunker end; top framing and side plates bent; bunker eyeglasses broken; bunker draw-hook casting broken.

Engine 805.—Bunker eyeglass broken.

London and North-Western covered goods No. 72,881.—Broken up.

London and North-Western waggon No. 30,200.—Two solebars, two headstocks, two middle bearers, eight end planks, 12 quarter planks, four end pillars, four axleboxes, one axleguard, and 12 bottom planks broken, and ironwork bent.

London and North-Western waggon No. 11,998.—Two headstocks, one diagonal, eight end planks, six bottom planks, four axleboxes, four buffer

castings, and four bearing spring shoes broken; four axleguards, four buffer rods, brakework, and brake guard bent.

London and North-Western waggon No. 33,406.—Two headstocks, one solebar, four buffer castings, and one buffer rod broken; two brake guards, four axle guards, two "V" hangers, three buffer rods, and one coupling link bent.

Griffiths and Sons' waggon No. 52.—Five end door planks, one headstock, and two axleboxes broken; four axleguards, two buffer rods, and brakework bent, and two bearing springs strained.

Lancashire and Yorkshire waggon No. 26,241.—One headstock, one side rail, two end door planks, and one brass step broken; four axleguards, one brake guard, and brakework bent.

Lancashire and Yorkshire brake-van (10-ton) No. 24,201.—One headstock, one end pillar, three end footboards, one buffer casting, one roof stick, one axlebox, and four lights broken; four corner plates, one drawbar, two axleguards, and two buffer rods bent, and one brake standard broken.