

tender in front, and that it was in charge of an acting driver of small experience, who had for his fireman a cleaner of very short service.

I do not think that the driving of passenger trains should be entrusted to only an acting driver if it can be avoided, and when this does occur the second man on the engine ought certainly to have some experience.

This collision is one of a class which would not occur if automatic continuous breaks were generally adopted.

The Assistant Secretary,  
(Railway Department,) Board of Trade.

I have, &c.,  
F. A. MARINDIN,  
Major.

Printed copies of the above report were sent to the Company on the 8th February.

## LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

(Railway Department,) Board of Trade,

13th February 1883.

SIR,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Minute of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the double collision that occurred on the 1st instant at Hillhouse, near Huddersfield, on the London and North-Western Railway.

Hillhouse No. 1 cabin is situated at the south-west end of Huddersfield goods yard, and is about half a mile from Huddersfield station.

On the day in question the London and North-Western train to Kirkburton was drawn up at Hillhouse cabin, the Lancashire and Yorkshire train from Meltham to Bradford was drawn up close behind it, and while these trains were stopped, in consequence of the section in advance being occupied, the Lancashire and Yorkshire train was run into by a London and North-Western train, which was proceeding from Huddersfield to Leeds, and the force of this collision drove the Lancashire and Yorkshire train against the London and North-Western train, which was in front of it.

Four passengers in the Kirkburton train, six in the Lancashire and Yorkshire train, and one in the North-Western train to Leeds are returned as having been hurt, but their injuries are believed to be slight. The guard of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train was also slightly hurt in the back.

The Kirkburton train consisted of a tank-engine and six vehicles, the first and last being third-class coaches with break compartments. The guard rode in the break compartment of the last coach. The vehicles were coupled together with the patent chain break, which was controlled to the extent of half of the train by the driver, and the other half of the train by the guard. The Lancashire and Yorkshire train consisted of a tank-engine, four coaches, and a break-van; the guard in charge was riding in this break-van, which was coupled to the coaches with Fay's patent break, which was worked by the guard. The Stockport train consisted of an engine and tender and six vehicles, which were coupled together with the patent chain break. This break was controlled from the engine and from the guard's van at the tail of the train.

The buffer-sockets and the tie-rod of the last coach on the Kirkburton train were broken. The break-van and three coaches of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train were damaged. One of the engine buffer-castings in the train to Leeds was broken. No vehicles in any of the trains left the rails, and no injury was done to the permanent way.

The London and North-Western Railway between Huddersfield station and Hillhouse is at present undergoing some alterations, in consequence of three additional lines of rails being constructed between these places. The new signals in connection with No. 3 cabin, which is at the north end of Huddersfield station, and No. 1 cabin, at Hillhouse, were also undergoing alterations, and were not complete at the time. The line between these cabins is perfectly straight, the gradient falls 1 in 105 for 341 yards from Huddersfield, and after that it falls 1 in 90 for the remainder of the distance.

This section of railway is worked on the permissive block system, and has, up to the present time, been treated as part of Huddersfield station yard. When the alterations are completed the Company propose to work the passenger lines on the

absolute block, but as Huddersfield is at present a single-sided station with about 160 to 170 trains passing through it daily, and the platform is only sufficient to receive three short or two long trains, it is necessary to get the trains out of the passenger station as soon as practicable; consequently, they have been sent on towards Hillhouse before that section of railway could be cleared.

The first collision occurred about 578 yards on the Hillhouse side of Huddersfield station platform.

The evidence is as follows:—

*Charles Wilson*, signalman on 1st February in No. 3 box, Huddersfield station, stated: The Kirkburton train left Huddersfield at 10.20 a.m. There was a train in the section between my cabin and Hillhouse No. 1 cabin at this time, and I cautioned the driver. The next train was the 9.57 a.m. Lancashire and Yorkshire train, which left the station at 10.22 a.m. I cautioned the driver of that train. The 8.40 a.m. train from Stockport to Leeds left at 10.26 a.m. and I also cautioned the driver of that train. I am quite sure he understood my caution, as he put his hand up. It was very foggy at the time; I could not see more than 25 yards. There was a fogman at my advance-signal. The Hillhouse down distant-signal is on the same post. I could not see this fogman owing to the fog. The line is worked on the permissive system between Huddersfield No. 3 and Hillhouse No. 1. I work a starting-signal for trains leaving Huddersfield. I lowered this signal for each of the three trains on the day in question. I cautioned all three train drivers verbally, after lowering the starting-signal, as I had not received line clear from Hillhouse. When the line is clear I do not exhibit a caution signal. I had not received line clear from Hillhouse, and I said to the driver of the third train when starting, "There is another train in front; go down steady," and I showed him a green flag. I have been about 10 years in the railway service, and about 7 years a signalman. The London and North-Western train (Stockport to Leeds) passed my cabin at about walking speed.

*James Wood*, London and North-Western platelayer, stated: I was flag signalling on the morning of the accident, 1st February, at John William Street bridge, which is being reconstructed. I was about 10 yards from Huddersfield No. 3 cabin. I saw the three trains go down towards Hillhouse, and I showed each driver a green flag. I heard the signalman at No. 3 box tell the driver of the Stockport train to go steady down, and he showed him a green flag also. I cannot say whether fog-signals were exploded by any of the three trains referred to on the morning in question.

*Thomas Henry McCrea*, porter at Huddersfield, stated: On the morning of the accident, 1st February, I was fogging for both roads at the up home-signal for No. 3 cabin, and I received instructions to put down a fog-signal, to caution each train going down towards Hillhouse. I saw the Kirkburton train go down, I cautioned the driver, and he ran over a fog-signal put on by me. I saw the Lancashire and Yorkshire, London and North-Western, and Stockport trains go down also. I waved a green flag sharply to the driver of the last train. Both the driver and fireman were leaning over the side of their engine, and I believe they saw my flag. I also put down one fog-signal for each train, which exploded. I called to the driver of the Stockport train to go down steady, and I think he heard me. It was very foggy. I think I could see about 40 yards. I think the third train from Stockport, was running at about 14 miles per hour when it passed me. I have been about six years in railway service, and have done fogman's duty about four years. I think there was an interval of two or three minutes between the London and North-Western and Lancashire and Yorkshire trains, and about six or seven minutes between the Lancashire and Yorkshire train and the train from Stockport.

*David Brooke*, London and North-Western platelayer, stated: I was fogging for the up and down goods lines on the 1st February. I was stationed 30 yards on the Hillhouse side of the up home-signal for the goods line near Huddersfield No. 3 cabin. I saw the three trains go down. When the third train went down Tom McCrea took my green flag from under my arm, and waved it sharply up and down to the driver of the train from Stockport. The driver and stoker were both looking towards the flag, and I called out, "Go down steady." There was a fog-signal down for the third train, and I heard it explode. McCrea had no flag of his own; he had been working with a lamp all the morning. He had plenty of fog-signals. The train from Stockport was running about 14 miles an hour.

*William Yates*, guard of the 10.15 a.m. train, Huddersfield to Kirkburton, on the 1st February, stated: I left Huddersfield at 10.20 a.m. and travelled to Hillhouse No. 1 cabin, and my train was brought to a stand there by a red flag. I was just getting out of my van to return to protect my train, when I saw the Lancashire and Yorkshire train approaching, and the driver of that train motioned with his hand and said, "All right, guard; I will not hit you." His engine came to a stand when about four yards in rear of my train. I observed a fogman near the up home-signal for No. 3 Huddersfield cabin, and other fogmen a little further on. I heard the latter shout, "Go down steady; there is a train in front." It was foggy. I could see the Lancashire and Yorkshire train about 30 yards before it reached me. Immediately my train came to a stand, I prepared to leave my van, for the purpose of protecting my train. I had fog-signals and a red flag ready on the seat. The tail-lamp showed a good light. My train was thrown forward four or five yards by the force of the collision. The buffer-sockets of my van were broken. One of the tie-rods was also broken. I was in my van at the time of the collision, and was not hurt. No vehicle left the rails. My train had been standing about three minutes, when the Lancashire and Yorkshire train was brought to a stand in rear of my train. My train consisted of a tank-engine and six vehicles, the first and last being third-class, with break compartments. I rode in the break compartment of the last coach. The vehicles were coupled with the patent chain break, half under the driver's and half under my control.

*Thomas Howarth*, driver of the 9.32 a.m. train, Lancashire and Yorkshire, Meltham to Bradford, on the 1st February, stated: I left Huddersfield at 10.22 a.m. I was cautioned by a fogman when passing No. 3 cabin; the man waved a green flag and had put down a fog-signal. He said to me, "Go down steady; there is a train just gone." I was not stopped at the Huddersfield No. 3 cabin. On receiving this caution I proceeded slowly to the end of the viaduct. I received no further caution. The next thing that I knew of the line being occupied was that I saw the Kirkburton train in front of me, when I was about 20 yards from it. I was prepared to stop, and I came to a stand about six yards from it. I saw the London and North-Western guard in the van, looking out of the door when I pulled up. The door opens inside. I did not speak or motion to the London and North-Western guard. I cannot recollect speaking to him or

making any motion. I did not see any fogmen between Huddersfield No. 3 and the point where I came to a stand. It was foggy, but I could see the length of the train. I had seen the Kirkburton train leave Huddersfield station in front of me. I did not run over any fog-signals after running over the one at No. 3 cabin. The fogman that cautioned me was porter Tom McCrea. I ran over a fog-signal that he had apparently laid down. The Kirkburton train could not have been long at rest when I came up to it, probably two minutes. I cannot say whether the London and North-Western guard's van door was open or not. I cannot recollect saying anything to the London and North-Western guard or making any motion to him. I have been about 17 years in railway service, and about eight or nine years a driver. I and my fireman remained on the engine and were not hurt.

*William Staynton*, fireman with the train from Meltham on 1st February, stated: I was five or six yards from the London and North-Western train when I saw it, and our train was immediately brought to a stand. When I saw it I was on the left-hand side of my engine. I saw the London and North-Western guard looking out of his van. I do not know whether the van door was open or not. I did not speak to the London and North-Western guard or motion to him. I had no communication with him whatever. I did not hear my driver speak to the guard, nor the guard to him. We were only running about two miles an hour when I saw the Kirkburton train. It was a tank-engine on my train, and I applied the screw-break to stop the train.

*Benjamin Illingworth*, guard of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train on the 1st February, stated: My train runs from Huddersfield to Bradford via Mirfield. It consisted of four carriages and a van coupled with Fay's patent break, the van was the last vehicle. I left Huddersfield at 10.22 a.m. I was running late on account of the fog. On leaving Huddersfield I was cautioned by a fogman at the east side of the crossing. He was standing near the Hillhouse down distant-signal on the down main line. I heard one fog-signal explode. After proceeding 200 yards past that fogman I was brought to a stand behind the Kirkburton train. I had stood there about two or three minutes when my train was struck by a London and North-Western train, which was running at about 10 miles per hour. I was standing at my break handle when I saw the London and North-Western train coming. I put two turns on my break. I had not time to jump out. I allowed myself to drop on to the floor. I was slightly hurt in the back. No vehicles of my train left the rails. I heard some fog-signals explode in the rear of my train just before the collision. I do not know who had put down the fog-signals. I had some fog-signals in my satchel, but I did not go back, because the fog-signalman near the down distant-signal was protecting me. I could not see him. I could only see about two or three carriage lengths owing to the fog. We drew down from the station very slowly, about three miles an hour. I know that this section of the railway was worked on the permissive block system. I had a person in my van who is a parcels clerk in the Lancashire and Yorkshire office at Huddersfield. His name is Wood, and he had a pass to Wakefield, where he was going to see Mr. Normington. I stood on the elevated platform in my van with my hand upon the wheel of the patent break, and I was looking out forward. I have a rule book, and know the rule with respect to the protection of my train. As I understand the rule, I am required in case of fog, when there is no fogman out, to go back and protect my train. I stopped in the elevated part of my van until the collision, and I looked back when I heard the London and North-Western train coming. I could see two or three carriage lengths. I did not take any fog-signals out of my bag, nor make any preparation for going back. I judge that I was within the Hillhouse No. 1 cabin home-signal when

my train came to a stand. The Hillhouse signals were undergoing alterations at the time, in connection with the new lines, and they were not in working order. The position of the new home-signal was at the opposite side of the line to where the old signal stood, but about the same distance from Hillhouse cabin. I knew there was a train in front of mine, although I could not see it. I did not know whether the train had gone forward or not. I did it by guess, I mean bringing my train to a stand. I have been about nine years in railway service, and five years a guard. I do not know whether the fog-signals that I heard were on the up or down line; they were at the Huddersfield side. I do not think that Rule 213, which directs a guard to go back and protect his train, applies to the present case, unless my train was detained five minutes, and then I should either tell my driver or put my break on before going back. I know of no rule about stopping five minutes before going back to protect my train.

*John Wood*, Lancashire and Yorkshire parcels clerk, stated.—On 1st February I got into the van of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train at Huddersfield, as it was leaving the station; I only just caught the train. I was going to see Mr. Normington at Wakefield on business. He had sent me a pass for that purpose. When the train was leaving Huddersfield the guard was in the van, and had hold of the break. He asked me where I was going, and I told him. I was in the elevation of the van, and I saw the London and North-Western train coming, and jumped out before the collision. I think it was 30 or 40 yards from the Lancashire and Yorkshire van at the time. I think my train had stood about two or three minutes before the collision occurred. After leaving Huddersfield we exploded one or two fog-signals before we came to a stand. When I jumped into the van the guard was making an entry in his book, and he afterwards sorted some letters and parcels. I did not hear any fog-signals explode after my train came to a stand, before the collision occurred. I believe the guard was in the van when the collision occurred. I spoke to him, saying "Look out, London and North-Western coming," when I jumped out.

*Aaron Sharratt*, London and North-western driver, stated: I have been in the service 28 years, and a driver for 23 years. On February 1st I was driver of engine 1,515, and I left Stockport at 8.44 a.m. I had a train of five coaches and a van fitted with the chain double gear break. Five vehicles, inclusive of the van, were under my control by the patent break. I left Huddersfield at 10.24 a.m. On passing Huddersfield No. 3 box, the signalman showed me a green flag. He never spoke to me at all, and did not bring my train to a stand. I never received a signal from anyone after I received the green-flag signal from him at Huddersfield No. 3. After leaving Huddersfield I did not run over any fog-signal. I shut off steam as soon as I entered upon the main line, over the crossing from the platform to the down main line. I first saw the Lancashire and Yorkshire train when 20 yards from it. I reversed my engine and applied the patent break. I was not running at more than five or six miles per hour. I am prepared to swear that I passed over no fog-signals after leaving Huddersfield, and I was not cautioned by anyone except the pointsman in the box by showing me the green flag only. When I see a green flag shown from a cabin window, I understand that I am to go cautiously. According to the permissive working, no train is allowed to follow another within five minutes, and then the train is to be stopped and the driver told verbally, that there is another train in front. I receive green-flag signals from cabins for permanent-way repairs. I did not know whether it applied to permanent-way repairs in this instance. I was not aware that the line between Huddersfield and Hillhouse was worked on the permissive system. I thought it was worked on the absolute block. When starting from Huddersfield, my

engine stood on the carriage turntable, at the platform. I am not sure, but I think it would be about 200 yards that I ran, after crossing on to the down line, before I struck the Lancashire and Yorkshire train. I think it would be four minutes after leaving the station that the collision occurred. I left the station at 10.24, and struck the Lancashire and Yorkshire train at 10.28. It was very foggy. I could not see more than 20 yards. I struck the Lancashire and Yorkshire train at a speed of five or six miles an hour. My breaks had not time to act. There was a red tail-lamp on the Lancashire and Yorkshire train. I have been working through Huddersfield, off and on, since 1862, but I did not know it was permissive block. I have been pulled up outside Hillhouse by the fixed signal, but I do not recollect meeting any obstruction there before. I do not think that my speed exceeded five or six miles an hour at any time on the morning in question between Huddersfield and Hillhouse. The breaking of the buffer-casting of my engine was the only damage to my train. I did not knock anything off the rails. I and my fireman remained on the engine and were not hurt. I never got any verbal warning from the signalman at Huddersfield or the fogman near that station. I had stopped at Huddersfield, but I did not see the train that I ran into leave the station.

*James Parker*, fireman to last witness, stated: We did not pass over any fog-signals between Huddersfield and the point of collision on the 1st February. I saw a green flag shown from the box at the end of Huddersfield platform, and after that I saw a porter waving a green flag; he was at the Hillhouse side of the Hillhouse down distant-signal. Both I and my mate saw it. I did not apply my break then. I did not see the train in front until we struck it. I had just got my hand-break on when the collision occurred. My mate pulled the cord of the patent break at the same time. We were running at five or six miles per hour. The engine was a tender-engine.

*Charles Palmer*, London and North-Western goods guard, acting as guard of the 8.40 a.m. passenger train from Stockport on the 1st February, stated: I was in charge of the train from Greenfield. I left Huddersfield at 10.24 a.m. I did not see or hear anyone caution the driver of my train, and I heard no fog-signals explode. I commenced sorting the parcels as soon as the train had started. I was in the rear part of the van. The speed would be about five or six miles an hour. I do not think it exceeded this at any time between Huddersfield and Hillhouse. I was sent by the shock of the collision, against the partition in the van. None of the vehicles left the line. I did not hear the driver whistle for the break. As soon as he pulled the break we struck the train. My train consisted of an engine and tender and six vehicles, and had break-power on six vehicles; either the driver or myself could apply the break, which was the chain break. My van was the last vehicle. After I had recovered from the shock I went out to see what had occurred. I went forward to the engine, and then I came back at once, and on getting to the rear

of my train I saw there was a flagman protecting it. Seeing that there was a flagman protecting my train I did not think it was necessary for me to go back. I know the rule says that I should go back at once. I did not speak to the flagman, but I saw him standing on the same line that we had run over, exhibiting a flag. He was 300 yards back. The fog suddenly lifted partially after the accident. I have been seven years in the railway service, and became a guard as soon as I had learned the duties. I was a platelayer on the Great Northern for two years previous.

*Henry Marsden* and *Lawrence Bamforth*, London and North-Western platelayers, stated: On the 1st February we were working on the line on the viaduct next Huddersfield station just before the collision. We saw the Kirkburton train, the Lancashire and Yorkshire train, and the Stockport train go down towards Leeds. Just before the last of the three trains passed, we noticed a porter fogging. He placed a fog-signal on the line, and it exploded. He also showed the driver a green flag. We heard the fog-signal go off when the last of the three trains passed over it.

Marsden has been a platelayer rather more than three years, and Bamforth has been a platelayer about six years.

*George Prestwick*, driver of the London and North-Western 10.15 a.m. train to Kirkburton, stated: On the 1st February when I left Huddersfield station I received a caution-signal with a green flag from the signalman in No. 3 cabin. He did not speak to me. I ran over one fog-signal about 100 yards from the crossing from the platform to the down line. The fogman spoke to me, and said as I passed, "Mind you go steady down." I had been standing some time at Huddersfield. I left at 10.20; 10.15 a.m. was my right time. I had to wait till a train from Leeds left the platform. I had got off my engine when the collision occurred, and I asked the fogman who stopped me at Hillhouse No. 1 if he would go to the pointsman and ask if I could draw down as far as No. 1 cabin. He said there was a Lancashire and Yorkshire train in front standing at No. 2.

#### COLLISION AT HUDDERSFIELD.

No. 20, second-class.—2 headstocks, 1 middle cross-bar, 1 diagonal, 1 longitude bar, 2 buffer casings, 1 buffer-rod broken, 1 buffer-rod, 2 ascending steps bent, body moved, axle-guards shifted; cost, 15*l*.

No. 8, van.—1 headstock split, 2 buffer-casings, 6 elevation lights broken, 1 buffer-rod bent, axle guards shifted, and body moved; cost, 10*l*.

No. 181, first-class.—2 carriage sills, 2 headstocks, 2 carriage cross-bars, 2 diagonals, 2 longitude bars, 4 buffer casings, 1 brass ring coupling broken, 2 ascending steps, 1 longitudinal shaft bent, body moved; cost, 25*l*.

No. 947, third-class.—2 headstocks, 1 middle cross-bar, 2 longitude bars, 1 end panel, 2 buffer-castings and packings broken, 1 tread-step bent; cost, 15*l*.

#### Conclusion.

The evidence is contradictory as to the verbal warnings which the Huddersfield signalman and the fogman who was employed just outside that station gave to the driver of the London and North-Western train to Leeds, and it is also contradictory as to whether a fog-signal had been placed on the rails to warn the driver of the train to Leeds that the line in front was occupied. The engine-driver of the North-Western train to Leeds stated, that he received no verbal warning, and that he did not run over a fog-signal when leaving Huddersfield, whereas the signalman in Huddersfield No. 3 cabin stated, that he did give this driver a verbal warning, and he is borne out in this, by a platelayer who was employed in signalling on the bridge close by, and the porter, who stated that he put a fog-signal down, is

confirmed in this by three platelayers. Under these circumstances I cannot but conclude, that the engine-driver of the train to Leeds did not exercise that amount of caution that he ought to have done, and that the collisions were the result of this man's neglect.

The Lancashire and Yorkshire train appears to have been standing for two or three minutes before it was run into; and the guard, considering the crowded state of the line, and that there was a dense fog, should have taken proper means to protect his train, particularly when he had one of the Company's clerks in his van, who could have assisted him.

This precaution, though very important under circumstances like the present, does not appear to have been acted upon by the guards of any of the trains. They appear to have considered that their trains were protected by the fogmen who were stationed between their trains and Huddersfield.

The speed of the London and North-Western train at the time of the collision was probably about five or six miles an hour. The trains at the time of the collisions were on a descending gradient of 1 in 90.

Huddersfield, which is at present a one-sided station, is not fit for the large amount of traffic which passes through it, and I am glad to say that the London and North-Western and Lancashire and Yorkshire Joint Companies are at present engaged in considerably enlarging this station, which is to be made into a double-sided station when the works now building are completed.

The Secretary,  
(Railway Department,) Board of Trade.

I have, &c.,  
F. H. RICH,  
Colonel, R.E.

Printed copies of the above report were sent to the Lancashire and Yorkshire and the London and North-Western Railway Companies on the 5th April.

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## LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

Board of Trade, (Railway Department,)  
16th April 1883.

SIR,

In compliance with the instructions contained in the Order of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 23rd ultimo, at Bishopstoke station, on the London and South-Western Railway, when Colonel Bell Martin, who was a passenger by the 10.15 a.m. express train from Waterloo, was killed.

The train reached Bishopstoke about 26 minutes late. It was Good Friday, and the train was very heavy.

Bishopstoke is a junction station. The trains from London, which consist of portions for Portsmouth, for Southampton, and for Salisbury, are separated and are despatched to their various destinations after reaching Bishopstoke.

Colonel Bell Martin was travelling in the Southampton portion of the train with a ticket for the Continent.

This portion of the train consisted of an engine and tender, a break-van, in which the guard in charge was travelling, 12 coaches, and a second break-van at the tail of the train, in which the assistant guard was travelling. It was detained about six or seven minutes at Bishopstoke.

About three or four minutes after the train arrived at Bishopstoke, Colonel Bell Martin appears to have gone into the refreshment room for a cup of coffee. He had been there about three minutes, and was drinking the coffee and eating a bun, when he perceived a train moving away from the platform.

He asked the young girl who had been serving him, if it was his train? and on finding out that it was, he rushed from the room, knocking against the door post, then he ran against a post on the platform which supports the roof, then against a porter who was standing about half-way between two of the posts that support the roof, and then he struck the second post and fell on his back, with his face upwards, on to the carriage step of about the sixth coach of the train, which was moving off.

He was carried in this position and apparently senseless, to the end of the platform, and on reaching the ramp at the end of the platform, when his right side lost the support