

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE AND LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN
JOINT STATION, HUDDERSFIELD.

Board of Trade, Railway Department,
8, Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall, London, S.W.,
10th May, 1905.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of the 22nd April, the result of my inquiry into the causes of the collision which occurred on the 21st April between a passenger train and an engine with empty coaches attached, at Huddersfield, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire and London and North Western Joint Railway.

In this case, as the Lancashire and Yorkshire 2.20 p.m. train from Mirfield was arriving at Huddersfield Station on the up south line, it was run into by a London and North Western engine with two empty coaches and a van, which had started in error from the up main line in the station.

Two passengers of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train were killed and nine injured, and the driver and fireman of the Lancashire and Yorkshire engine and the London and North Western fireman and the shunter were also injured.

The Lancashire and Yorkshire train consisted of a four-wheels-coupled tank engine with a leading and a trailing radial axle, running chimney in front, fitted with the automatic vacuum brake working blocks on the four coupled wheels of the engine, and of the following 7 vehicles, viz :—

								Wheels.
One second van	6
One first van	4
Two thirds	6
Two bogie thirds	8
One third van	6

all fitted with blocks worked by the automatic vacuum brake on all wheels except the centre pair of the four six-wheeled vehicles.

The London and North Western engine was a six-wheels-coupled bogie engine with a six-wheeled tender, fitted with vacuum and steam brakes working blocks on the six coupled wheels of the engine and six wheels of the tender, and the usual hand brake; and the empty coaches were two corridor thirds and a brake van. The engine was running tender first at the time of the collision.

The first three coaches of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train were telescoped and the second one completely broken up—the London and North Western engine was a heavy one, weighing with its tender about 90 tons.

The collision occurred at 2.36 p.m.

Details of damage to rolling stock and permanent way are given in the Appendix.

Description.

Approaching Huddersfield Station from the east, there are two pairs of passenger lines running east and west, known as the north and the south lines, the up lines to Huddersfield being on the south side of the respective down lines.

At a distance of 100 yards east of the station is No. 2 signal-box, which controls all the movements of trains approaching from the eastward, the bridge of up directing signals to the platform roads being 112 yards east, and the up home signals 204 yards east of the signal-box.

The up and down south lines run quite straight past the signal-box into the station, and are known in the station as the up and down main lines. These are not platform lines, but just beyond the east end of the up platform there are facing points in the up main leading to the up platform line, which is thus the most southern of the lines in the station. North of this is the up main, then the down main, and then what is known as the up and down platform No. 2 road, which runs along the south side of the large island platform on the north side of the station.

Thirty yards west of the signal-box are facing points in the up main line leading to the down main line, and then by another set of facing points just east of the island

platform, to the up and down platform No. 2 road. Just at the east end of the station is a cross-over road between the up and down main lines, and there are disc signals between the up and down main lines and between the up platform and up main lines in the station for controlling shunting movements from the up main and up platform line to the down main line. The disc signal relating to the up main line is 66 yards beyond the points of the cross-over road in the up main line to which it refers, being just clear of the fouling points between the up main and up platform lines, and these points are 80 yards from the facing points in the up main line which lead across to the up and down platform line, and about 40 yards from the fouling point of the crossing.

There are slip points in the cross-over road above mentioned, leading from a turntable road on the south side of the station, out on to the down main line.

The up home signal requires one of the directing signals before it can be lowered to the safety position, and the directing signal leading from the up main line to the up and down platform No. 2 line locks the disc signal for setting back from the up to the down main line, through the points of the cross-over road being locked when the directing signal is lowered.

Evidence.

Reuben Payne, signalman, Huddersfield No. 2, states: I have been in the Company's service 14 years as a signalman, except one year when I was a porter. On Good Friday (April 21st), I came on duty at 2 p.m. for eight hours duty, having finished at 10 o'clock on the previous night. When I arrived on duty London and North Western engine No. 610 was on the up north, standing opposite the cabin, wanting to turn, having come from Hillhouse shed. There was a 3.2 p.m. Birmingham goods signalled on the down main, and the 2.15 p.m. Lancashire and Yorkshire was at the up and down platform. Huddersfield No. 1 telephoned that the Birmingham goods was stopping at Slaithwaite to detach cattle, and he cancelled it. The 2.15 p.m. Lancashire and Yorkshire went away first, and then I let the engine on to the dock; the turntable was occupied with coaches. When the driver left my box he went through 57 points, over 58 leading to the down platform, and then he backed on to the down south line through 58 and 65 points and then through 77 and 80 to the turntable. He then came out with the coaches on to the down south line and then ran through 75 points on to the up main. When the coaches were detached, he ran out again from the up main to the down south line and then backed into the turntable road and turned his engine. As soon as the engine was turned, which took some minutes, I let him out again from the turntable road to the down south line and then passed him back through 75 points on to the up main, where the coaches were standing. All the movements, after the engine had picked up the coaches in the dock for the first time, were in charge of a shunter, and I moved the points in response to the shunter's wishes, which were called out to me. When the engine had first put the coaches on to the up main, before he turned, I lowered 95 disc for him to cross from the up main to the down south preparatory to his going to the turntable to turn. I had to put 95 disc to danger before I could pull 77 and 80 points to allow the engine to go to the turntable. I am quite sure I never lowered 95 disc again before the collision. I noticed the engine going through the cross-over 75 the last time he backed on to the coaches. As soon as I had lowered disc 78 for the engine to come out of the turntable on to the down south line I was offered the Lancashire and Yorkshire passenger train on the up south line from Hillhouse No. 1. I accepted it at once, and as soon as the engine had gone on to the up main through 75 points, I offered the passenger

train to Huddersfield No. 1 box on to the up and platform line. It was accepted at once. I restored 75 points and set the road to the up and down platform (No. 2) and I lowered Nos. 7 and 4 signals at 2.34 p.m. I did not notice the engine and three coaches moving until after the passenger train had passed No. 7 signal. I was in the act of putting them to danger again behind the passenger train when I saw the engine and three coaches on the signal-box side of 75 points, and before I could get to the end of the cabin the collision had occurred.

Frederick Thomas Alford states: I have been in the service about 18 years, at Huddersfield all the time. I have acted as carriage shunter close on three weeks. I had acted as shunter before on many occasions, but not during the last 8 years. On Good Friday I came on duty at 10.15 a.m. (finishing the day previous at 4 p.m.) About 2.10 p.m. the fireman of engine No. 610 fetched me from the Manchester end of the platform, saying the engine wanted to turn. I went down with him to the other end of the platform and found the engine was standing at the traps of the turntable road. I fetched him out and put him into the short dock. After the 2.15 p.m. Lancashire and Yorkshire train to Halifax had gone, I fetched him out and coupled him on to the coaches in the turntable road. After that I said "Ready when you are ready." He went ahead and drew the coaches from the turntable road to the down south line. I told the signalman he wanted to go on to the up main line, and when he had pulled the points over, the engine backed with the coaches on to the up main. After that I put my brake on, uncoupled the engine, and said "Ready when you are ready." The disc signal was on the opposite side of the engine to where I was standing, so that I did not see it. The driver went ahead again on to the down south line. I told the signalman where he wanted to go, and the driver backed his engine on to the turntable. I helped him to turn the engine. After a few minutes I said "Ready," and the driver went ahead on to the down south line and the signalman set the cross-over road and the engine backed on to the coaches on the up main line again. I coupled the engine on to the carriages and said "Ready when you are ready." I was on the opposite side of the engine to the disc signal, and did not see the disc signal. When I coupled the engine on I went straight back to the brake van to take the brake off, but the driver started before I got into the van. I did not notice No. 95 disc signal

when the driver backed on to the coaches the last time. I think the disc signal would be about opposite the footplate of the engine. I got into the van to take the brake off. I thought the driver was going across on to the down south line again, but the next I knew was the collision. I am quite sure I did not say "Right, go ahead," but only "Ready when you are ready." If I had been on the other side of the engine I might have seen the disc signal.

Frederick William Haigh, driver, states : I entered the service of the London and North Western Railway on the 4th October, 1880. I was a fireman about nine years, and have been a driver about 16 years. On Good Friday, 21st April, I booked on duty at 4.30 a.m., after having 14 hours rest (booking off at 1.50 p.m. the previous day), for a turn of duty to 1.30 p.m. I was relieved at 1.15 p.m., and was due to book off at Hillhouse at 1.45, when I was ordered to engine No. 610, to Huddersfield to turn. I arrived at Huddersfield Station at 1.50 p.m. When I got to Huddersfield No. 2, I told the signalman I wanted to turn the engine on the turntable, and I sent my fireman for the shunter. I stood at No. 2 box a few minutes. We had to go over the points to get on to the down south. Whilst I was standing at the box I sent my fireman for the shunter, and he brought back shunter Alford. As soon as the shunter arrived, I went forward on to No. 1 platform road and just over the points. I then backed on to the down south line and then went forward on to the turntable road. I took all my instructions from the shunter. He was on the ground. There were three coaches on the turntable road so I could not turn my engine at once. The shunter hooked me on to these three coaches. We drew the coaches out on to the down main line and backed them on to the up main line. The shunter hooked off the coaches. We then passed through the cross-over road from the up main to the down main and then backed into the turntable road. As soon as the engine was turned, I came out on to the down main line and then backed on to the coaches on the up main line again. The disc was off on the first occasion when I was unhooked from the carriages and ran from the up main to the down main before going into the turntable road to turn my engine. After turning my engine and coming out on to the down main and backing on to the up main to the coaches I noticed the disc signal for the cross-over up main to down main was off. When I backed on to the coaches, the engine being tender in front, and the safety valve of the engine being about opposite the disc signal, the footplate would be about six feet ahead of the disc signal. At that time the shunter hooked on the coaches and said "Go ahead." I crossed over to my mate's side to reverse the engine. Whilst I was reversing, some conversation took place between me and Inspector Turner, who was at the bottom end of the up platform.

During this conversation I heard the shunter shout out "Go ahead." I did not look at the disc again but put on steam and went ahead. Seeing the disc off when backing on to the coaches I was under the impression I was going back to the down main. I was aware of nothing more until I heard a whistle. I leaned over the framing and had only just time to come back and apply the brake before the collision. I was working entirely to the shunter's orders, and that coupled with the fact of having a big load of coal on the tender in front must have been the reason why I did not notice the engine had not gone through the cross-over road on to the down main line again, as I had previously done, and I thought the shunter and signalman knew everything that was being done. My engine was "A class" six-wheels-coupled bogie, six-wheeled tender, fitted with vacuum and steam brakes, working the blocks on the six coupled wheels, and six tender wheels, and hand-brake on the six tender wheels, working the same blocks. I applied the steam brake when I tried to stop my engine. The speed was quite slow at the time of the collision. I am accustomed to shunting at Huddersfield. I usually look at the disc signal for crossing from the up to down main line, but I did not on this occasion.

Arthur Nicholson, fireman, states : I have been in the service 8 years, about 5½ years a fireman. I worked the same hours as driver Haigh on the 21st April. I booked off at 12 noon on the 20th. I recollect, after turning the engine and backing on to the coaches again (I was firing at the time), Haigh crossed over to my side of the engine, as I thought to look at the disc signal. I did not notice that we did not go through the crossing from the up main to the down south. I am accustomed to shunting at Huddersfield and have never known my engine to cross from the up main to the down south without the disc, for the operation, being off.

William Cliffe, driver, states : I entered the service of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Company on the 18th April, 1877. I have been a booked regular driver since 1891. I signed off duty at 12.35 a.m. on Good Friday. I signed on duty again at 2.10 p.m. (on Good Friday), expecting to sign off in the usual course about 10.45 p.m. I was in charge of engine No. 664, which is a four-coupled passenger tank engine, working the 2.22 p.m. Mirfield to Huddersfield. On approaching Huddersfield No. 2 cabin all signals were off for us. The first I knew that anything was wrong was seeing the London and North Western engine approaching me on the same road, and at that time I was just about underneath Huddersfield No. 2 cabin. I had just time to apply the vacuum brake fully, and was then thrown about and do not remember anything more. At the time we were passing No. 2 we should be travelling 10 to 15 miles an hour.

Conclusion.

The circumstances leading up to this unfortunate collision were as follows :—

A London and North Western engine in charge of driver Haigh arrived at Huddersfield No. 2 signal-box about 1.50 p.m., in order to get on to the turntable to turn, the turntable at Hillhouse depôt, a mile or so away, being too short for this particular engine, No. 610. But the turntable road was blocked by three empty coaches, which had to be removed before the engine could get on to the turntable, and as the sidings were all full, driver Haigh under instructions from signalman Payne and shunter Alford, drew the empty coaches out with his engine on to the down main line, and then backed them through the cross-over road on to the up main line inside the station. As soon as his engine was

uncoupled, Haigh took it back through the cross-over road to the down main line, and then backed on to the turntable, where the engine was turned with the assistance of shunter Alford.

Haigh then took his engine out on to the down main line again and backed it through the cross-over road on to the empty coaches he had left standing on the up main line, which had to be replaced in the turntable road. The engine was coupled on to the empty coaches by shunter Alford. All the movements of the points for these operations were carried out by signalman Payne in response to the information shouted to him by Alford; and the disc signals for backing through the cross-over road from the up to the down main line, and for coming out of the turntable road on to the down main line were lowered to safety for the movements they covered.

Just as signalman Payne had lowered the disc signal for the engine to come out on to the down main line after it had turned, he states he was offered the Lancashire and Yorkshire passenger train, from Hillhouse No. 1 signal-box, on the up south line, and he accepted it at once, the time being 2.33 p.m., and as soon as the London and North Western engine had gone through the cross-over road on to the up main line, Payne offered the Lancashire and Yorkshire train to the No. 1 box at the other end of the station, on the up and down platform No. 2 road, and it was accepted at once, so Payne restored the points of the cross-over road to the normal position, and set the road to lead from the up south line to No. 2 platform road, and lowered all the signals for the Lancashire and Yorkshire train at 2.34 p.m.

Before these signals could be lowered, it was necessary, owing to the interlocking of the levers, to place the cross-over points and the disc signals relating to those points, in their normal position.

As soon as the London and North Western engine had backed on to the empty coaches at 2.34 p.m., shunter Alford coupled it on again, and went back to the van to take off the hand brake which he had applied when the coaches were placed on the up main line, and driver Haigh started almost at once without looking at the disc signal alongside his engine, thinking he was going back through the cross-over road on to the down main line and thence to the turntable road. He did not notice that he did not go through the cross-over road as he was expecting to do, and the result was he ran past the cross-over road on the up main line in the facing direction, and after going another 45 yards he ran into the Lancashire and Yorkshire incoming train just after the latter had taken the points of the crossing to the up and down platform No. 2 road, the two engines meeting almost buffer to buffer.

There are some discrepancies in the evidence of driver Haigh and that of shunter Alford and signalman Payne. Haigh states that as soon as Alford had coupled the engine to the coaches, he said "Go ahead," whereas Alford states that the words he used on all occasions after coupling and uncoupling the engine were "Ready when you are ready."

Haigh also states that, when backing on to the coaches the last time through the cross-over road, the disc signal for the movement through the cross-over road from the up main to the down main line was lowered to the safety position, and that accordingly he thought was going back at once through the cross-over road as soon as he was coupled on to the coaches, and so as soon as he had reversed his engine, he started again without looking a second time at the disc signal. Signalman Payne states that the disc signal was not lowered at this time, and pointed out that he must have put it to danger before the engine left the turntable road, as the disc signal from that road is interlocked with the disc signal of the cross-over road, and both cannot be lowered at the same time. Of course Payne could have lowered it after the engine had come out on to the down main line from the turntable, after putting back the points of the turntable road, but it is unlikely he did so, as he states the Lancashire and Yorkshire train was offered to him just as the engine left the turntable road. There is no corroboration for one statement or the other, but assuming Haigh is correct in both cases, he was solely to blame for not looking at the disc signal at which he was standing before moving his engine; he had only to look over the side of the footplate to see it.

He should also have noticed that his engine did not go through the cross-over road but continued running in the facing direction on the up main line, an absolutely unauthorised movement; and if he had been looking out he should have seen the Lancashire and Yorkshire train approaching, whereas he did not see it until he heard the whistle of the other engine, when it was too late to stop.

He states that seeing the disc signal off when approaching the empty coaches the last time, receiving the shunter's order "Go ahead," and thinking that the latter and the

signalman knew what was being done, led him to suppose that he could move ahead again, as he was expecting to go through the cross-over road, and as he was running tender in front with the coal piled up he did not notice that the engine did not take the points of the cross-over road, and that he was aware of nothing until he heard the whistle of the Lancashire and Yorkshire train ; but nothing can be held as an excuse for his moving with the disc signal at danger, which it must have been for two minutes before the collision occurred, as the interlocking would prevent it being lowered with the south line signals in the safety position.

Haigh is an experienced man with a good record, having been a fireman for nine years and an engine driver for 16 years. He had come on duty on the day of the accident at 4.30 a.m. and was relieved at 1.15 p.m., and was due to book off at 1.45 p.m., after being nine hours and a quarter on duty, but no one else being available he was ordered to take the engine No. 610 to Huddersfield to turn, and he had thus been on duty 10 hours at the time of the collision.

I have, &c.,
E. DRUITT,
Lt.-Col., R.E.

The Assistant Secretary,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

APPENDIX.

DAMAGE TO ROLLING-STOCK.

Lancashire and Yorkshire engine, No. 664.—Smoke box and chimney broken off ; tube plate fractured ; smoke box end between tube holes will require renewal ; both steam pipes and T pipe in smoke box require renewal ; vacuum exhaust and jet pipes broken ; blast pipe broken ; buffer plate and engine framing at front badly bent ; leading radial spring pillars and two spring hangers broken ; whistle stand, top of fire box, broken off ; hand railings broken off ; coal bunker rails damaged ; angle stay on left hand side of boiler for water tank broken ; one boiler clothing sheet damaged ; cylinder tap rod bracket broken and shaft bent under cylinder ; vacuum and heating pipes at front broken ; both trailing buffers and vacuum pipe damaged ; screw coupling at bunker end damaged and draw hook leading end broken ; middle washout plug left hand side of firebox at bottom knocked out ; one boiler tube in firebox knocked out up to fire-hole door ; three cab eye-glasses broken ; bolts for bolting cylinder and smoke box tube plate sheared off.

London and North Western engine, No. 610.—Leading buffer plank bent and left corner bracket broken ; left buffer broken and right buffer bent ; right injector broken, also clips ; vacuum pipe broken.

Tender No. 552, attached to engine No. 610.—Radial buffer casting broken ; front headstock broken ; both outside and inside framings broken ; footplate damaged ; trailing wheels knocked from under ; hornblocks knocked off and broken ; back buffer plank knocked off ; brake shaft and all brake work damaged ; dip pipe and connections knocked off ; drawbars and rods damaged ;

tank knocked off frame ; hole knocked in back of tank and badly damaged ; both steps broken.

Damage to empty London and North Western Carriages.

London and North Western Corridor Third, No. 2,390.—One end damaged ; headstock and solebar bent ; two buffer castings, two buffers, and one bogie centre casting broken ; gangway damaged ; seven quarter lights broken.

London and North Western Corridor Third, No. 2,276.—One buffer casting broken.

Lancashire and Yorkshire train.

Lancashire and Yorkshire Second Van, No. 424.—One end telescoped ; two compartments and body completely smashed.

Lancashire and Yorkshire First, No. 146.—Both ends telescoped ; coach smashed completely.

Lancashire and Yorkshire Third, No. 1,752.—One end telescoped ; three compartments, &c., smashed ; two axles strained ; one axle-box broken.

Lancashire and Yorkshire Third, No. 173.—Two buffer rods bent ; one headstock shaken.

London and North Western Third Vestibule, No. 2,390.—Two floor boards, one bottom rail, seven quarter lights, two buffer heads, and two buffer castings broken ; one steel headstock and two steel soles bent ; one vestibule door and gangway damaged.

London and North Western Third Vestibule, No. 2,276.—One buffer casting broken.

DAMAGE TO PERMANENT WAY.

Six point and crossing chairs broken.
Twelve ordinary chairs broken.
Three rails bent.