

set an example which the station master will do well to follow on future occasions. He should not have gone away before he had seen that the safety of the station was properly provided for. It is evident that he has neglected to train the platelayers in the proper use of fog signals.

The foreman of porters should not have allowed the day signalman to leave his post until the arrival of the man whose duty it was to relieve him.

The day signalman evinced carelessness in not see-

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ing that the fog signalmen were provided with the fog signals necessary for their work.

The accident has brought to light very great carelessness in the performance of the duties at Ravensthorpe station.

I have, &c.,
F. H. RICH,
Lieut.-Col., R.E.

To the Secretary,
Railway Department,
Board of Trade.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

SIR, *Manchester, 16th February 1872.*

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred on the 26th ultimo at Victoria station on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

Two passengers are reported to have complained of being hurt.

On the day in question the train, which is timed to leave Staley Bridge at 7.15 a.m., for Manchester arrived, and stopped just outside Victoria station, Manchester, about 7.50 a.m.

The train consisted of an engine and tender, a composite carriage, with a break compartment and a guard, a first-class, a second and two third-class carriages. The vehicles were coupled together in the order in which they are given. All the carriages were fitted with continuous breaks. The engine and tender were attached to the train with a slip coupling, so that the guard in the break compartment, which was next to the tender, could detach the engine whenever he wished to do so.

He appears to have done so just before the train arrived at No. 2 signal cabin, which is about 70 yards to the east of Victoria station, Manchester.

The train stopped about 40 yards to the east of No. 2 cabin, as the home signal was at danger. This home signal was lowered about half a minute after the train stopped. The train was detached from the engine before it stopped.

The approach to Victoria station from the east is on a gradient, which falls 1 in 49 towards the station.

When the home signal at No. 2 cabin was lowered, the engine-driver allowed his engine to move forward towards the station, and the guard of the train, by loosening his break, allowed his train to follow. There was an interval of 10 or 12 yards between the train and the tender of the engine.

It is customary at Victoria station for the engines of the local trains to move into the station by one road, and for the trains to follow down the incline, and to be turned into the several dock lines which are appropriated to them.

The engine and tender of the train from Staley

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Bridge was intended to move forward on the main line towards Salford, whereas the carriages of the Staley Bridge train were intended to be turned, by the signalman in No. 2 cabin, into No. 2 dock line, which is appropriated to the Staley Bridge trains.

This is done to enable the engines to get immediately to the other end of their trains, and be ready to proceed at once on the return journey.

On the occasion in question the signalman in No. 2 cabin pulled the lever of a pair of points on the up line, instead of the lever of the points on the down line. These levers are next to each other in a lever frame, which contains 24 levers.

The signalman noticed his mistake as soon as he saw that the train was taking the wrong road. He called to the guard of the train to hold on, but the latter could not get his breaks to act, with sufficient quickness to prevent a slight collision with the tender of the engine that had brought the train to Manchester.

No part of the train left the rails, but one carriage body was slightly shifted on its frame.

The accident was caused by the mistake of the signalman in No. 2 cabin.

The signals and points in No. 1 and No. 2 cabins at the east end of Victoria station, Manchester, are not interlocked.

The mistake made by the signalman in No. 2 cabin is certain to occur, sooner or later, with the best of men. A much more serious mistake, such as moving the points while the train is passing over them, is likely to occur at any time, unless the points and signals are arranged on the locking principle, that separate signals are established for each separate line, and that no engine or train is allowed to advance, until the signal is lowered for the line on which it is to proceed.

The points and signals should be interlocked, so that the points must be properly set, before the signal can be lowered.

I have, &c.
F. H. RICH,
Lieut.-Col. R.E.

The Secretary,
Railway Department,
Board of Trade.

MANCHESTER, SHEFFIELD, AND LINCOLNSHIRE RAILWAY.

SIR, *Normanton, 27th January 1872.*

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 12th inst., I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances attending the collision which occurred on the 8th inst. near Attercliffe station, on the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway, between a passenger train and a portion of a goods train.

Five passengers are reported to have been shaken.

Attercliffe is the first station out of Sheffield, on the line to Rotherham and Doncaster. It was opened in July last, and is situated on a descending gradient of 1 in 100 towards Rotherham, without any protection against danger from runaway vehicles.

About 460 yards east of the east end of the up platform a siding called "Brown's Siding," for the accommodation of some new steel works, joins the up