

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade (Railway Department),  
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,  
December 14th, 1900.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of 27th November, the result of my enquiry into the cause of the accident that occurred on the 15th November at Pendleton New Station, near Manchester, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

In this case the driver of the 5.50 p.m. passenger train from Manchester to Liverpool over-ran the platform at Pendleton New Station with the leading portion of his train, and on a green light being given him as a signal to set back, he went ahead instead for a distance of 48 yards, when the train was stopped by the guard applying the vacuum brake. The driver then set back, but by that time the engine and two leading carriages had passed over a pair of catch-points situated 50 yards beyond the platform starting signal, and as no one thought of holding them over, the result was that the engine and two leading carriages left the rails.

The train consisted of a four-wheels-coupled tank engine with radial axles at each end, running chimney first, fitted with the automatic vacuum brake, a third van, two composites, a third, a third bogie, and a brake van; with brakes on 28 wheels out of the 36.

None of the passengers complained of injury.

The damage done to rolling stock is given in the Appendix; and as regards the permanent way, only two chairs were broken.

*Description.*

Pendleton New Station, where this slight mishap occurred, is on the Lancashire and Yorkshire line from Manchester to Liverpool.

There are four lines through the station running approximately east and west, viz., an up and down slow and an up and down fast. There are two island platforms, one between the fast, and one between the slow lines, and the train concerned was on the down slow line, the most southerly of the four.

The signal cabin is just beyond the east end of the island platform between the slow lines, the platform being 200 yards long. The starting signal for the down slow line is opposite the extreme west end of this platform on the proper side of the line.

The platform terminates at its west end at the Broughton Road overbridge, which forms a short tunnel 38 yards long, and just beyond this tunnel or about 50 yards from the down slow starting signal are runaway catch-points in the down slow line, which in advance of this point is on a rising gradient of 1 in 88. The line through the station and for some distance behind it is also on a rising gradient varying from 1 in 140 to 1 in 283.

*Evidence.*

*Jeremiah Rothwell*, driver, states: I entered the service in June, 1867, and have been a booked driver since 1875. On November 15th I had signed off duty at 12.40 a.m. and signed on again at 1.25 p.m., expecting to finish about 12 midnight. I left Victoria with the 5.50 p.m. slow train for Liverpool, which consisted of equal to six and a half vehicles. In pulling up at Pendleton New Station I overshot the platform about an engine and half a carriage length, owing to the wheels skidding through the greasy state of the rails; it was slightly raining at the time. After the passengers had alighted, including some from the third-class half van, which was next the engine, I saw a green light waved up and down from the platform, which I took to be a right away signal, and proceeded, but the train was brought to a stand by the guard applying the vacuum brake in the rear. We would then be about an engine and three carriage lengths

through the tunnel. I then saw some one giving me a white light waved from side to side to set back, and in doing so two coaches came off the rails with all wheels and the engine with two pairs of wheels at the catch-points. I was not aware that there were catch-points situated at this point. I am quite sure it was the foreman porter who gave me a "right away" signal in the first instance, and that it was a green light waved up and down. I know that I ought to get a signal from the guard before I go right away, and I now see from the Book of Rules that a green light waved up and down is not a "right away" signal. My engine was a four-wheels-coupled radial tank engine, with radial axles at each end—fitted with automatic vacuum brake to all four driving wheels—the brake was in fair working order, with 20 inches vacuum; but when I applied the brake the wheels skidded. All the signals were off for me, including the platform starting signal.

I was running about 20 miles an hour when I came to the end of the platform at the Pendleton New Station.

*W. J. Meyers*, fireman, states: I entered the service in 1892, and have been a fireman since October, 1898. On November 15th I was fireman for driver Rothwell and worked the same hours as he did. We were working the 5.50 p.m. slow train to Pendleton New Station, and on approaching that place the driver applied the vacuum brake just before reaching the platform, but the wheels skidded owing to the rails being greasy. I opened the sand valves, but we over-ran the platform about an engine and one carriage length. About one minute after this I saw a green light waved slowly up and down by someone on the platform about three or four coach lengths behind the engine, which I took to be a right away signal. We started, but the guard almost immediately applied the vacuum brake in the rear and pulled up the train. Two white lights, waved from side to side, were then given to us to set back, and the driver commenced to do so, when two vehicles next to the engine and two pairs of wheels of the engine left the rails at the catch-points. I did not know that there were catch-points at this place.

*John Carter*, foreman porter, states: I have been 20 years in the service as signalman, and have been a foreman porter at Pendleton for three months. On November 15th I came on duty at 12 noon to work until 11.30 p.m. I was in charge of the platform when the 5.50 passenger train from Manchester to Liverpool arrived. When the train came to a stand it was an engine and one carriage length past the platform, inside the tunnel. The starting signal was off. I immediately took steps to keep the passengers in the carriage which was off the platform, telling them to keep their seats, though some had got out when the train first stopped. After going to the rear of the train to confer with the guard, I gave a signal to the driver to set back to the platform. I waved a green light from side to side across my body, and sent Porter Lingard to tell the driver to set back; but before he could get there the driver had run ahead as if he was going right away. He came to a stand again with the rear vehicle opposite the porter's room, but I do not know why, although I suppose the guard stopped him. After he had been standing for about half a minute he started setting back. I could do nothing, as I had no lamp. I did not give him a signal to set back a second time; of this I am quite sure, as I had no lamp, having given it to porter Lingard. I did not see the guard give a signal to set back. I know where the catch points are situated, but I did not know that the train was on them, and the first I heard of anything wrong was when the passengers commenced to shout, and when the carriages which were off the rails began to bump in the tunnel. I made inquiries as to any passengers being injured and no one complained. I am quite sure that it was before the driver started by mistake that I sent porter Lingard to tell him to set back.

*Frederick Arkwright*, guard, states: I have been in the service since 1887, and have been a guard for six years. On November 15th I came on duty at 3.30 p.m. to work until 11.30 p.m. I was guard of the 5.50 p.m. train from Manchester to Liverpool, and on arrival at Pendleton New Station the driver over-ran the platform about an engine and one carriage length. It did not

strike me that the driver entered the station at too high a speed. The foreman was at the front end of the train, and after the passengers, who could alight, had alighted, I said to the foreman, "Call him back," and at the same time I gave a white light waved slowly from side to side. Instead of setting back the train commenced to move forward, and I jumped into the van and applied the vacuum brake and stopped it. By this time my van was close to the end of the platform. I then walked up to the foreman, and he said, "I gave him a green light to set back." I told him that I thought the driver had mistaken it for a go-ahead signal, and that he had better walk up to the driver and tell him what to do. I then heard a porter say to the foreman, "Shall I go?" I am sure that this occurred after the driver had started by mistake. I thought the catch-points were a train's length further ahead than their actual position, and that we were not close to them. Immediately after this the driver set back, and the carriages came off the rails at the catch-points. I did not give any set back signal to the driver a second time, and I did not see the foreman porter give a signal. I had got to my van when I found there was something wrong, but I got out at once and ran up to the foreman and saw that the passengers were all right and no one hurt. I then went back to the signalman and told him what had happened, and placed fog signals on the rails opposite the cabin. Third van No. 57 and Compo. No. 104 left the rails with all wheels, and the engine with two pairs of wheels. The train was formed as follows:—

	Engine	...	...	Wheels.
	3rd van	...	...	6
	Compo.	...	...	6
	Compo.	...	...	6
	3rd ...	...	...	6
	3rd bogie	...	...	8
	Van	...	...	4

There were brakes on all the wheels of the four-wheeled van and bogie, and on the outside wheels of the six-wheeled van and carriages. The brake was in good order; my gauge showed 19 inches vacuum.

*James Lingard*, lamp porter, states: I entered the service about 13 months ago. On November 15th I came on duty at 7 a.m. to work until 6.30 p.m. I saw the 5.50 p.m. train from Manchester to Liverpool arrive at Pendleton Station, and noticed that the driver had run past the platform; almost two carriages were off the platform. I heard the guard tell foreman Carter to bring the train back, and saw Carter give a green light to the driver. I could not say how the green light was waved, but instead of setting back he ran ahead, when the train was again stopped. Carter then gave me his lamp and sent me to tell the driver that we required him to set back to let the passengers get out of the train. Before I had got half way through the tunnel, or about half way, the driver began to set back and the carriages came off the rails. As I was going through the tunnel I was using the lamp only for lighting my way—using the white light. When the driver began to set back I turned the lamp to red to stop him, and then got through one of the manholes and ran towards the engine showing a red light again. I do not know whether the driver saw my light or not. I am quite sure that I did not give the driver a signal to set back. If I had reached the driver before he had begun to set back, I should have told him to do so. I forgot all about the trap-points, and neither foreman Carter nor the guard mentioned them.

*Conclusion.*

The sequence of events that led up to this slight accident was as follows: Driver Rothwell over-ran the platform at Pendleton New Station with his engine and one carriage, but seeing some workmen get out of this carriage on to the platform ramp under the over-bridge, he assumed that all the passengers had alighted, and that the green hand signal shown him by foreman porter Carter to set back was a right away signal,—his semaphore starting signal being off—and he accordingly went ahead. Rothwell, the driver, says this hand signal was a green one, waved up and down; Carter, the foreman porter, says he waved his green lamp across his body, but in any case Rothwell was wrong in starting, as neither is a right away signal, and he further should not have started without a signal from the guard, whereas he saw that it was the foreman porter who was giving him the signal. He does not appear to have seen the white light waved slowly from side to side by guard Arkwright as a signal for him to set back.

Guard Arkwright seeing that the driver had made a mistake jumped into his van and stopped the train with the vacuum brake after it had gone about 48 yards, but by this time the engine and two leading carriages had got over the catch-points situated just beyond the over-bridge.

The guard then went to foreman porter Carter and suggested that Carter should walk up to the driver and tell him what to do, but porter Lingard, who was standing by, offered to go, and Carter gave him his hand lamp, and he ran towards the engine, but when he had got nearly half-way through the short tunnel formed by the over-bridge, Rothwell commenced to set back, having apparently come to the conclusion that that was what he was meant to do. The result was that the two carriages next the engine left the rails with all their wheels and the engine with two pairs of wheels.

The driver and fireman state that they are certain a signal was given them to set back after the train had been stopped by the guard, while the foreman porter and guard each state that they gave no such signal, and it is hardly possible that the light of Lingard's lamp, while he was running up the tunnel, could be mistaken for a set-back signal.

The driver was in a position to know that part of his train had gone over the catch-points, as their position is most plainly marked by large white letters on the retaining wall just alongside them—whereas the men on the platform were not; moreover, he had often passed the spot in day time.

The foreman porter's evidence to the effect that he sent Lingard to tell the driver to set back, before the driver started by mistake, does not agree with that of the guard and of Lingard himself, who both state that it was after the train had been stopped by the guard applying the brake. The foreman porter is evidently mistaken on this point, and his message to the driver to set back after the train had been pulled up by the brake would have resulted in the carriages being derailed just the same, but as before stated, the driver was in a position to know that part of his train was over the catch-points, whereas Carter was not. The guard admits that he thought they were some distance further on than their actual position.

However, the blame for the accident must rest on the driver, Rothwell, who started from the platform without a proper signal from the guard, and who also forgot about the catch-points over which he had gone, or was ignorant of their actual position although they are plainly marked.

The Assistant Secretary,  
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.,  
E. DRUITT,  
Major, R.E.

## APPENDIX.

## DAMAGE TO ROLLING STOCK.

Lancashire and Yorkshire Third Van, No. 57.—  
Wheel tyres cut. (Off the road.)

Lancashire and Yorkshire Composite, No. 102.—  
One steam pipe damaged.

Lancashire and Yorkshire Composite, No. 101.—  
Wheel tyres cut; one axle and one axleguard  
slightly bent; and one panel broken. (Off the  
road.)