

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),  
12th December 1865.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., the officer appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred near the Salford station, on the 10th ultimo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. E. TENNENT.

*The Secretary of the  
Lancashire and Yorkshire  
Railway Company.*

*Hampton Court,  
8th December 1865.*

SIR,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 10th ultimo, between a passenger train and a goods train, near the Salford station on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

There are sidings north and south of the line on the west of the Salford station. A pointsman, Ryall, 50 yards on the west of the down passenger platform, works a semaphore signal at his cabin, and a distant-signal 400 yards from it on the east of the station. There is a spectacle signal 37 yards to the west of Ryall's cabin, worked by a pointsman, Bosson, whose cabin is 150 yards to the west of that signal; and there is a crossing on the main line 10 yards further to the west from Bosson's cabin.

A special train for the Liverpool races left the Victoria station, Manchester, at 10.42 a.m., 12 minutes late, on the day in question, consisting of an engine and tender, 12 passenger carriages, and two break-vans. These vans were coupled, one at each end of the carriages, the one to two, the other to three carriages by continuous breaks. The engine-driver received a caution signal from a pointsman east of the Salford station, who held up three fingers to intimate to him that the previous train was three minutes ahead of him. But he found the distant signal east of Salford at all right, as well as the semaphore signal on the west of the station. Having shut off his steam in approaching Salford, he turned it on again after passing through the station. But he observed that the spectacle signal beyond Ryall's cabin, and 87 yards west of the down platform, was at danger. He saw a platelayer, also, with a flag in his hand, and he heard a fog-signal explode soon after he passed that signal. It was very foggy, and he could only see those indications of danger for a short distance. But he did his best to pull up, and he reduced his speed from about 10 to 4 or 5 miles an hour before he struck the waggon of a goods train which was crossing the main line at the crossing already referred to, 253 yards on the west of the down platform, and 166 yards on the west of the spectacle signal.

The engine lost a corner of its buffer-beam, and its injector pipe was bent, but it went forward with the train, and none of the passenger carriages were damaged or knocked off the rails. Four of the passengers were injured.

The goods train which was thus in the way of the passenger train arrived on the up line from Preston at 9.45, and was then placed in a siding on the north of the main lines. After it had been there for 20 minutes, the goods inspector went to the pointsman, Bosson, to say that he wanted to have it taken across to the south side, because it blocked up some bleacher's waggons which he was anxious to take down the

hoist (near the siding) and unload without delay. Bosson replied that he could not allow the goods train to come out until certain express trains had passed. Six trains then went by, and the goods inspector came again, after a further interval of about 25 minutes, and repeated his request. He said further, according to Bosson, though he does not himself admit it, that if Bosson did not "turn the train across" he would fetch Mr. Rawson the goods manager to him. The goods inspector then went away and liberated the waggons which he wanted, by moving other waggons in the sidings, without informing Bosson that he had done so. Believing that it would still be necessary to move the goods train, Bosson allowed it to be drawn out on the up line as soon as another train, the 10.30 from Bolton, had passed towards Manchester. While it stood on the up line the 10.15 train from Manchester went by, as well as a train of empty carriages which followed it; and he then arranged with Midgley, another pointsman, to get it across the down line to the south sidings. They thought, indeed, that no time ought to be lost in adopting this course, inasmuch as two coal trains were due, and a passenger train was nearly due, on the up line. But the special race train was also overdue on the down line, and when the goods train, consisting of an engine and tender, 12 waggons, and a break-van, was about half way across, the race train arrived and came into collision with one of its waggons, loaded with coke, as I have already described.

Bosson turned his spectacle-signal to danger, and warned one of the platelayers who were acting as fogmen not to let anything pass till the line was clear, before he allowed the goods train to cross the down line. Ryall, who was 193 yards east of Bosson, and 37 yards to the east of the spectacle signal, saw that signal turned to danger just after he learnt by the sounding of a gong near his cabin from the east of the station that the passenger train was approaching. He had just taken off his signal and distant-signal after the passage of the empty carriage train, and he had no time to apply them again, having no idea that the goods train was about to be shunted across, to stop the passenger train. He placed, however, two fog-signals on the rails, of which one exploded; and this was probably the fog signal which the engine-driver of the passenger train believed to be on the west of the spectacle signal.

The goods inspector was undoubtedly to blame for not informing the pointsmen, when it ceased to be necessary, that he no longer required the goods train to be shunted across from the north to the south sidings. But the special defect in the arrangements which led to the collision was the want of a means of intercommunication between Ryall and Bosson. In the absence of proper information, Ryall was actually taking off his signals for the passenger train to pass along the down line about the same time that Bosson was about to shunt the goods train across that line. I recommend that a bell-and-arm communication be supplied for the use of these men. Ryall ought not to be allowed to take off his signals for the down line till he has first ascertained from Bosson that he may do so with safety. And Bosson ought not to obstruct that line until he has warned Ryall that he is about to do so, and learnt, by receiving permission, that Ryall's signals are at danger.

I am glad to learn that considerable extensions and alterations are in progress in this part of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. I refrain on that account from making further remarks as to the improvements that are required.

I have, &amp;c.

H. W. TYLER,  
Capt. R.E.

*The Secretary of the  
Railway Department,  
Board of Trade,  
Whitehall.*

*Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway,  
Secretary's Office.*

SIR, *Manchester, 21st December 1865.*

Your communication of 12th December instant, handing copy of Captain Tyler's report on the collision which occurred near the Salford station on 10th November ultimo has been submitted to the Directors of this Company, and I beg to inform you that they

have ordered Captain Tyler's recommendations to be carried into effect.

Yours obediently,

*The Secretary of the  
Railway Department  
Board of Trade,  
Whitehall.*

WM. S. LAWN,  
*Secretary.*

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),  
Whitehall, 8th Dec. 1865.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred on the 10th ultimo, at Miles Platting on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

*The Secretary of the  
Lancashire and Yorkshire  
Railway Company.*

I am, &c.,  
J. E. TENNENT.

SIR,

*Whitehall, 4th Dec. 1865.*

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 10th ultimo between two passenger trains at Miles Platting on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

Miles Platting is at the summit of the incline, a mile and a quarter long, on which the Lancashire and Yorkshire traffic east of Manchester is carried to and from the Victoria station. It is itself an important station, and is the site of the junction between the Ashton branch and the main line. It is passed by 225 trains daily, besides special trains and engines. The main line is at present, from the want of sufficient accommodation, very frequently obstructed by the shunting of the goods trains.

The south main line platform at Miles Platting is 176 yards long, and there is a distant signal 700 yards to the east of it.

On the 10th November the 3.35 a.m. goods train from Normanton, due at Miles Platting at 7.50, reached that station at 10.15 a.m. in a thick fog. Some of the waggons were run forward by hand into the *London* siding while the remainder, 16 in number, went forward on the *straight line* towards their destination, Oldham Road. But in the course of this operation, the straight line waggons followed too closely upon the siding waggons. The siding waggons had not gone sufficiently far into the siding to leave a clear passage for those on the straight line. The foremost of the latter struck the hindmost of the former, which was thrown off the rails; and the traffic of the up or south main line thus became temporarily obstructed.

At 10.20 a.m. a passenger train from Middleton, due at 10.18, arrived at the platform, and stopped short of the disabled waggon, which was immediately to the west of it. At 10.24 a passenger train from Oldham, due also at 10.18, drew up at the platform, behind the Middleton train. At 10.25 the 8.50 train from Bradford, due at Manchester at 10.27, following upon the same line of rails, came into collision with the Oldham train opposite the platform and about 50 yards from the end of it.

The Oldham train consisted of an engine and

tender, five passenger carriages, and a break-van. The guard, who was standing by the side of his van when the collision occurred, states that he could not see more than nine yards for the fog, and that there was a platelayer 80 or 100 yards behind his train, whom he had seen in passing. The station inspector told him to draw down, and his train was about to move forward when it was struck. One first-class carriage of this train was damaged. The return of the company states that two or three persons were shaken, but I only heard on the spot of one lady having complained of injury.

The Bradford train started punctually from that station at 8.50, and the engine-driver found the Miles Platting distant-signal at danger, and saw a platelayer (acting as a fogman) near it with a green flag in his hand. The platelayer said nothing as the train passed him, but one fog-signal which he had placed on the rails exploded.

The train was then travelling at a speed of about eight miles an hour, and the engine-driver proceeded still more slowly towards the station until at 10 or 15 yards (as he thinks) from the platform he saw a second platelayer, also acting as a fogman. This man had no fog signals on the rails, but said something to the fireman, who was on the side of the engine next to him, in passing. The fireman turned to the engine-driver, who was on the other side of the engine, and said, "Go on, the train has gone away." The engine-driver turned on his steam again to draw up to the platform, and then saw the break-van of the Oldham train "about 10 yards" in front of him—too late to be able to pull up.

The platelayer in question states that he was 200 yards behind the Oldham train when the Bradford train passed him. He had used fog-signals to caution the Middleton train and the Oldham train, and he had placed one on the rail in front of the Bradford train, but it had dropped off again, and that train reached him before he could get another out of his pocket. He was not aware that the truck was off the line on the west of the station, but he knew that the Oldham train had not had time to go forward and must be at the platform. He therefore said, according to his account, to the fireman, as the Bradford train passed him, "Hold on, there is a passenger train standing at the station."

It would thus appear that the collision occurred in consequence of a misunderstanding on the part of the fireman of the Bradford train of what the platelayer said to him, by his interpreting the "hold on" of the platelayer to mean "go on," and so translating it to the engine-driver. And the fireman gave me the impression, when I examined him, of being a man not unlikely to have made such a mistake. But the platelayer ought, according to his own showing, to have employed his red flag instead of contenting himself with speaking to the fireman as the engine passed him. It would have been better if the station master had, as soon as the waggon got off the line, warned the platelayer of the circumstance, as the platelayer would then, no doubt, have been more energetic in his endeavour to stop the Bradford train.

I am glad to learn that an alteration is to be made in future in the company's time bills in regard to the