

division, and which I trust, under the circumstances, will be satisfactory to the Commissioners.

The additional remmarshalling of the trains at Crewe and Stafford (which would be caused by a rigid adherence to the regulation) to the two trains in question, the running speed of which cannot be altered, since they are both mail trains, and under the exclusive orders of the Postmaster-General, would necessitate a dangerous rate of travelling, which might, in its consequences, be more serious than the very trifling risk attending the regulation under discussion.

Appendix No. 56.
London and North
Western Railway.
Manchester and
(Birmingham.)

I have, &c.,
MARK HUISH, Secretary.

Capt. Harness, R.E.,
&c. &c.

SIR,

Manchester, April 18, 1849.

IN answer to your letter of the 16th instant, relative to the enclosed communication from the "Commissioners of Railways," I find that we can arrange to run the guard in the rear of all our trains, with the exception of the 11.40 A.M. and 8.55 P.M. trains.

By running the guard in the rear of the 11.40 and 8.55, it will cause an additional shunting at Crewe and Stafford.

I will put this regulation into force with all the trains except the two before named, which I will leave, as at present, until I receive your instructions to the contrary.

I have, &c.,
HENRY WOODHOUSE.

Capt. Huish, London.

APPENDIX No. 57.

Appendix No. 57.
Lancashire and
Yorkshire Railway.


LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

SIR,

April 14, 1849.

I BEG to lay before you, for the information of the Commissioners, the result of my inquiries into the circumstances of the accident which occurred on the Manchester and Leeds Railway, on the 17th of last month, whereby one man met his death.

It appears that the 7 A.M. train from Leeds divides at Blue Pits: the part for Manchester is



taken on by the same engine which brought it from Leeds, that for Liverpool is taken on by an engine despatched for the purpose from Manchester, and it was this engine which caused the accident. From the above diagram, it will be seen that this engine may either go by the direct line to Blue Pits or round the Fork, passing the junction at A, and going on to the through crossing, from whence it can be shunted back to Blue Pits station. If the engine take the direct line, it must travel tender foremost, there being no turn-table at Blue Pits; and for a single engine this is not an objectionable practice. If the turn-table at Manchester happens to be engaged, and the engine stands engine first, it must go round the Fork, as first described, in order to be right to take the train on to Liverpool. The engine-man appears to have guided himself by these circumstances, sometimes going one way, sometimes the other. On the occasion of the accident he went round the Fork, but instead of going on from the junction points at A to the through crossing three-quarters of a mile further on, he passed through the junction points, and immediately shunted back again through them (the points being weighted to keep open for the Leeds and Liverpool traffic), which of course brought him on the wrong line to Blue Pits. The pointsman turned on the danger-signal towards Blue Pits, but states that the morning was so foggy that he could not see it from the points, from which it is only 200 yards distant; the engine had not proceeded more than half-way up the wrong line when it came in contact with a ballast-engine, which was travelling down the line tender foremost; the tender of the ballast-engine was very much injured; that of the other not at all. The man who was killed was a workman, who was most improperly riding on the buffer-plank of the engine; he was jammed by the following waggon, which was raised off the rails, and pressed upon his thigh, and also pressed his back against the smoke-box.

Appendix No. 37.
Lancashire and
Yorkshire Railway.

The engine-man appears to be the person altogether to blame; he had only to run three-quarters of a mile further on, when he would have come to the through crossing, which would have taken him on his proper line.* There seems also to have been a remissness on the part of the pointsman in having up only the common signal in so thick a fog. The points being completely under the control of the pointsman, a recurrence of the accident may be prevented by giving a positive instruction to him not to allow any engine ever to pass back through the points on to a wrong line.

It appears from the evidence of George Boggatt, an engine-driver between Blue Pits and Bolton, that on the return journey from the latter place he is obliged to return tender first, in consequence of there being no turn-table at Bolton. I would recommend the attention of the Commissioners being drawn to this very objectionable practice, with a view to its correction.

I have, &c.,

Capt. Harness, R.E.,
&c. &c.

GEORGE WYNNE,
Capt. Royal Engineers.

Office of Commissioners of Railways, Whitehall,
April 17, 1849.

SIR,

I HAVE been directed by the Commissioners of Railways to inform you that, having received a report from Captain Wynne upon the cause of the fatal accident which occurred near the Blue Pits station on the 17th ultimo, they are desirous to request the Directors of the Company to consider whether it would not be conducive to the public safety to establish turn-tables at the Blue Pits and at the Bolton stations, the want of a turn-table at the former station having been the primary cause of the accident referred to, and a similar deficiency at the latter rendering it necessary, as stated in the evidence attached to Captain Wynne's report, for engines to travel tender foremost, in returning from Bolton to Blue Pits.

I have, &c.,

The Secretary of the
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company.

H. D. HARNESS,
Capt. Royal Engineers.

Appendix No. 58.
Stockton and Dar-
lington Railway.

APPENDIX No. 58.

STOCKTON AND DARLINGTON RAILWAY.

Secretary's Office, Darlington,
March 29, 1849.

SIR,

MARCH 27, 1849.—Hannah Beaston, of Thistleflat, near Crook, attempted to cross the railway at Blue Row, near Bishop Auckland, though warned not to do so by the gate-keeper, as a locomotive engine and a train of laden waggons were approaching. She was knocked down by the engine, which passed over one of her legs. Her leg was afterwards amputated, which brought on premature confinement, and death ensued on the morning of the 28th instant, at one o'clock.

An inquest was held at the workhouse, Bishop Auckland, before W. Trotter, Esq., coroner, and a verdict of accidental death was returned.

I have, &c.,

Capt. Harness, R.E.,
&c. &c.

OSWALD GILKES, Secretary.

Secretary's Office, Darlington,
March 31, 1849.

SIR,

SINCE my last report I have been furnished with a copy of the verdict (by the coroner), and think it better, as it is a special one, to forward it to you. I should have embodied it had I received it in time.

VERDICT.

" We find that the cause of Hannah Beaston meeting her death was accidental.

" We think that the engineman ought to be reprimanded for driving his engine at a rate above that allowed in their rules, it having been given in evidence that he was in the habit of going beyond his proper speed.

" Having inspected the plan of the line of railway, we find that the road to South Church ought to have been taken under the line, and that therefore the line at present crosses illegally the said road to

* The only excuse offered is, that he was told by the pointsman to make haste out of the way of the Manchester train, which was expected.