

Oldham and Middleton trains. These trains are joined together at a previous station and arrive at Miles Platting as one train on all days of the week but two. It is only right that as they arrive separately on those two days, an interval should be allowed between them, instead of their both being appointed to be at Miles Platting, as at present, at 10.18.

But the principal lesson to be drawn from this collision, is the want of extra sidings at Miles Platting in which shunting may be performed with the goods trains clear of the main line. I had occasion to draw attention to this subject in my report of the 13th October last, upon the collision that occurred between a passenger train and a coal train; the latter having

been stopped upon the incline while a goods train was shunting at the Miles Platting station. In this case, again, the passenger train was checked because a goods truck was thrown off the rails in shunting on the main line. The importance of the station, its position, and the magnitude of the traffic require that the above remedy of extension and re-arrangement should be applied with as little delay as possible at Miles Platting.

I have, &c.

H. W. TYLER.

Capt. R.E.

*The Secretary of the  
Board of Trade  
Whitehall.*

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),  
Whitehall, 5th Dec. 1865.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred near the Elland station on the 15th ultimo.

My Lords trust that the Directors will give Captain Tyler's recommendations their careful consideration.

*The Secretary of the  
Lancashire and Yorkshire  
Railway Company.*

I am, &c.  
J. E. TENNENT.

SIR,

*Derby, 30th November 1865.*

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision which occurred on the 15th instant between a passenger train and a goods train, near the Elland station, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

A single line from Halifax, a mile and a half long, joins the main line of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway at the North Dean junction, 31 miles from Manchester; and the Elland station is 1,300 yards south of North Dean, on the way to Huddersfield. The line between North Dean and Elland is nearly level, but passes through a tunnel 434 yards long, of which the north end is 500 yards from North Dean, and the south end is 374 yards from Elland. There is a distant signal 161 yards north of the tunnel, worked from the Elland station, and there are semaphore signals on the passenger platform at that station. There are also the usual main signals and distant signals at the North Dean junction, at which there are passenger platforms and a very considerable traffic.

The 10.30 A.M. express passenger train left Halifax one minute late on the day in question for Huddersfield, consisting of a tender, an engine, three passenger carriages, and a break-van. It was not due to stop either at North Dean or at Elland, and the branch pilot-man, who usually travels with it as far as North Dean, followed on a goods train; so that it was not necessary for the engine-driver to slacken speed at North Dean to allow him to drop off. The North Dean signals were lowered in due course for this train to pass the junction, and it ran through at a speed of 12 miles an hour. The junction signalman held up a green flag in one hand, which the engine-driver observed, and showed (he says) his extended thumb and four fingers with the other

hand, to indicate that the previous train was five minutes ahead, which the driver does not appear to have noticed. The distant signal from Elland (north of the tunnel) was at *all right*, and, the driver having turned on his steam again, the train passed through the tunnel at a speed of 15 miles an hour. On coming out again at the south end of the tunnel he found a goods train in front of him, at too short a distance to enable him to pull up. His tender struck the van of the goods train with great violence.

The tender was much damaged. The tank was crushed, the framing was doubled up, and the wheels were knocked from under it. The body of one (first-class) carriage was shifted on its framing. The van of the goods train was destroyed, three of the waggons were knocked to pieces, and others were damaged. The guard of the goods train had, fortunately for him, ridden on a waggon, third from the engine, through the tunnel. The engine-driver, fireman, and guard of the passenger train, and seven passengers, were more or less injured; but they were all, I was happy to learn, progressing towards recovery.

The goods train which was thus in the way of the passenger train, had reached North Dean at 9.35 from Normanton, and had commenced shunting immediately, to prepare for the return journey. After disposing of its waggons in the up sidings, and making up a fresh train from the down sidings, composed of an engine and tender, 37 waggons, and a break-van, it was ready to start again for Normanton soon after half-past 10; but the circumstances under which it then left North Dean form the subject of much conflicting evidence.

The junction signalman states that the engine-driver, having drawn past his signals in shunting, went away without giving him notice with his engine-whistle; that he hollered to him, "The Halifax to Huddersfield express is due—you must put back clear of the junction;" that he waved his hands up and down (while his back was turned to him) as a signal to him to stop, without being able to get his attention; and that he did not lower his signal for him to pass. He adds that there was an interval of five minutes exactly between the starting of this train and the passage of the passenger train past his junction, which is not likely to have been the case. The distance from the junction to the collision was only 1,084 yards. The goods train may have taken, and is said to have taken, four or five, while the passenger train would have taken perhaps two minutes, to run that distance; and there would thus have been an interval of not more than three minutes between them at the junction.

The ticket-collector, who is also foreman-porter and acts as inspector under the station master, corroborates the above statements of the signalman, that the engine-driver of the goods train went away without permission, without whistling, and without

the signal having been lowered ; and that there was an interval of five minutes between the two trains, from 10.31 to 10.36, by his watch. It did not occur to him to check the express train, "because he did not know it was so nearly due." He saw the station-master standing on the platform near the porter's room door talking to two gentleman as the goods train went away.

The station master states that he saw the goods train shunting at the station at 10 o'clock, that he went to the stables and to a pair of points not far from them and near the end of the branch platform, that he was at those points when the express train passed, that he then went into the warehouse to show the warehouse siding to a new porter, Dixon, who had arrived by the 10 o'clock train, and that going into the goods office he there received a telegraph message that the collision had occurred. He denies that he saw the goods train start, and states that he thought it was still in the siding when the express went by.

The porter Dixon, to whom the station-master refers to corroborate his statements, states that the station-master followed him into the goods yard shortly after 10 o'clock, and showed him round the sidings &c., and he gives a version of the course which they took quite different from the statements of the station master. He did not see the goods train go away, but thinks that he and the station-master must have been within 30 or 40 yards of it when it started. He agrees with a goods-clerk and a telegraph clerk that the station-master did not go into the goods office, but received the message reporting the collision outside the office and in the warehouse.

The engine-driver, fireman, and guard of the goods train all state, in opposition to the above evidence, that the ticket-collector (inspector) came to the engine when the train was made up, asked if they were ready to start, and told them to do so ; and that the engine-driver whistled accordingly for the junction signal, which was lowered for them to pass. They all agree further, that the station-master was standing talking to a gentleman near the door of the porter's room on the platform when they started, and that he saw them go away.

After hearing all the evidence that was produced in regard to these questions, I have come to the conclusion that the statements of these three men are correct, and that the station-master, the ticket-collector, and the signalman are to blame for having allowed the goods train, which was booked to stop

at Elland, to proceed in front of the express train from Halifax which was not timed to stop there. They were also to blame for not having, after the goods train had started, taken proper steps to warn the engine-driver of the express train that such a train was in front of him. They ought in common prudence to have done this just as much if the goods train had started without their sanction, as if it had gone with their permission. And, indeed, if it had gone, as the ticket collector and the signalman allege, in opposition to their wishes or injunctions, they would have been in that case the more likely to have realized the danger of allowing the passenger train to follow it so closely, to have checked that train by their signals, and thus to have prevented the collision from occurring.

In order to prevent such accidents from happening in future it is extremely desirable that the block-system of telegraph should be introduced between North Dean and Elland. The signalman at Elland cannot protect a train in the usual way by means of his distant-signal after it has passed that signal, because he cannot see it until it comes out of the south of the tunnel. And it is not right that any engine or train should be allowed to leave North Dean for Elland until the previous engine or train has been telegraphed clear from Elland, or vice versa.

The engine of this express passenger train was running tender first, for want of a turntable at Halifax, which should be supplied without delay.

The guard of the goods train being a spare, or relieving guard, was not supplied with a time-piece, though he is required to note his times of arrival and departure ; and he had not applied for one because other guards in a similar position are not so provided. The means of ascertaining the correct time at the different parts of their journeys are quite as necessary to these men as to the regular guards.

A raised stage, with levers for working all the neighbouring switches from that stage, and locking apparatus, as well as telegraph-instruments, are much required at North Dean. The view of the signalman is much obstructed there at present by the waggons in the siding.

I have &c.

H. W. TYLER.

Capt. R.E.

W. D. Fane, Esq.  
Board of Trade.  
Whitehall.

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),  
Whitehall, 5th Dec. 1865.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed Copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., of his inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 25th ultimo, near the Wigan station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

The Secretary of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company. I am, &c.  
J. E. TENNENT.

SIR,

Manchester, 29th November 1865.

In compliance with your instructions I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 25th instant near the Wigan station on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

The lines of the London and North-Western and the Lancashire and Yorkshire companies are very near to each other at Wigan, and there is a short junction line between them half a mile to the south of the Lancashire and Yorkshire station, which line is used principally for the interchange of mineral, but occasionally also for that of passenger traffic. The signalman of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Company at this junction has control over the traffic with the neighbouring sidings connected with the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. One siding, called the *short* siding, between the main lines of the two railways, is provided with a scotch block 94 yards to the south of the junction cabin. A portion of this siding is level, but the remainder rises slightly towards Wigan, to join the main line of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. The points which connect it with the main line are worked by a rod from the junction cabin.

On the afternoon in question the 5.30 passenger train from Manchester (via Bolton and Wigan) to Liverpool started from the former station about three minutes late. It consisted of an engine and tender, 12 carriages, and two break-vans, and was approaching the Wigan junction above referred to about 6.55,