

some of the carriages, got off the line, and caused serious injury to several persons, to point out that the Exeter and Crediton Railway had not been permitted to remain in the state in which it was, when inspected and authorized by the Commissioners of Railways to be opened for public traffic, inasmuch as the line had been altered by the substitution of a single for a double junction, and the introduction of a curve of about 14 chains radius, instead of one of 26 or 30 chains, which was made use of in constructing the double junction. I remarked, at the same time, that these alterations materially increased the danger to the public travelling on the Bristol and Exeter and Exeter and Crediton Railways; and suggested, that, if any means existed, the Exeter and Crediton Railway Company should be compelled to restore their line to the state in which it was when inspected and authorized to be opened for public traffic.

Their Lordships did not then deem it expedient to take legal measures to compel the Exeter and Crediton Railway Company to restore their line to the condition in which it was when first opened for traffic; and the Exeter and Crediton Railway Company represented that certain alterations, which were to be made, would remove any cause of danger at that part of their Railway. This representation has not, however, been fulfilled, as another accident has now occurred at the same spot,—fortunately unattended with injury to any person,—due, in the first instance, to the giving way of a guard-rail, and not actually occurring on the Exeter and Crediton Railway, but on the cross-over road for connecting the Exeter and Crediton line with the down line of the Bristol and Exeter Railway; but

which accident could not have occurred at all, except for the alteration from the double to the single line, as no such curve of $12\frac{1}{2}$ chains radius, and curving to the left, would have been in existence, except for that alteration.

I have, therefore, again to suggest, notwithstanding the absence of any precedent for doing so, that in the event of the Exeter and Crediton Railway Company declining to restore the line to the condition in which it was when first opened for traffic, means should be adopted for abating the danger to which the public are continually exposed in passing over this junction, and for which no parliamentary sanction exists.

I understand that the Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, who are part owners of the Exeter and Crediton Railway to the extent of two fifths of the capital, are willing to concur in this alteration being made, but that the decision finally rests with the London and South-western Railway Company; and, looking at the extension of their system westwards beyond Exeter, I trust that they will now see the necessity of removing this cause of danger.

It is a question, moreover, for their Lordships consideration, whether, while such an unnecessary cause of danger is permitted to exist, their sanction should continue to be given to any of the cheap train arrangements for trains passing over the Exeter and Crediton Railway.

I am, &c.

*The Secretary of the
Board of Trade
(Railway Department),
Whitehall.*

W. YOLLAND,
Colonel.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Board of Trade
(Railway Department),
Whitehall, 9th April 1866.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Col. Yolland, of his inquiry into the causes connected with the collision which occurred between two engines near Middleton Junction on the 19th ultimo.

*The Secretary of the
Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway Company.* I am, &c.,
J. E. TENNENT.

*Board of Trade
(Railway Department),
Whitehall, 31st March 1866.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to state for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, in obedience to your minute of the 24th instant, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended a collision that occurred on the 19th instant between two empty engines near Middleton Junction, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, when the driver, W. Bate, of the leading engine was killed, and the firemen of both engines were badly, and the driver of the following engine was slightly, injured.

The Oldham Branch of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway joins the main line at Middleton Junction, and there is a loop siding lying east of the junction and south of the up main line from Rochdale to Manchester, which is connected with the up main line by a pair of facing points at the junction, and also by a pair of leading points, called the top points, situated about 480 yards nearer to Manchester than the junction.

The down distant-signal is about 460 yards west of the top points, and there is another intermediate down distant-signal worked from the junction, which is about 80 yards west of the top points.

Some waggons, intended for Oldham, were standing in this siding on the early morning of the 19th instant, and the waggon nearest to the junction being a damaged waggon, the porter acting as pointsman at the junction went westwards to the top points to hold them open whilst an engine went into the siding to bring them out on to the up main line, in order that they might be shunted by a cross-over road on to the down main line; but before the engine brought the waggons out from the siding, the pointsman turned on the up and down distant signals to "danger," by which the cross-over road is protected.

The waggons were then pushed across to the down main line, the pointsman holding the points of the cross-over road, and then the engine was detached from the waggons, and returned by the cross-over-road to the up main line, for the purpose of proceeding towards the junction, along the up or wrong road, to another cross-over road lying nearer the junction, that the engine might be attached to the other end of the waggons and take them to Oldham.

Whilst the engine was shunting the waggons across from the up to the down line, the pointsman observed an engine advancing towards the junction on the down line from Manchester, and when the first engine returned from the down line and proceeded towards the junction, the pointsman turned off the down distant signal worked from the top points, and at the same time waved his hand lamp for the engine advancing towards the junction to come on. The pointsman thought this engine was just moving, and he ran towards the junction to be ready to hold the points for the engine with the waggons to pass on to the Oldham Branch.

The engine advancing towards the junction from the direction of Manchester was a tank engine on its way to Middleton Station for an early train to Middleton Junction, and the fireman states, that as they approached Middleton Junction they found both distant signals on at "danger" against them, and his driver shut off the steam and sounded the whistle, and then they saw a goods train thrown across the

down line from the up road; at which time they had just passed the first distant signal, and he then turned round and put on his break so as to diminish the speed, and saw another engine following them on the down line. He says they had not stopped at that time, but he told the driver to go on a little quicker, as there was another engine coming. He observed the driver with his hand on the regulator, and he states that they were still moving ahead when the other engine overtook and ran into them, somewhere about 5 a.m. He says that his engine carried a white light in front, and a red light behind; that he lit both lamps himself, and that they were both burning well when they left Miles Platting. His testimony is confirmed by the pointsman as to the white light in front, but it is contradicted by the driver and fireman of the following engine, who assert that there was no light at the tail of the leading engine.

The driver of the following engine, which was on its way to Oldham to bring an early train from that place, signed the books at the Locomotive Shops, at Miles Platting at 4.45 a.m., at which time his engine was ready to start. He was late that morning, as he had overslept himself, the proper hour for leaving being 4.30 a.m., and he states that the first distant signal stood at "all right" when he first came in sight of it, and that he never saw the other engine at all until he ran into it, at a speed which he and the fireman estimated at 8 or 9 miles an hour. He also states that the collision took place two or three minutes after five o'clock, and as Miles Platting is about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the spot at which the collision occurred, it is quite certain that he must have been travelling much faster than the rate he named. The driver of the leading engine had received a heavy

blow on the forehead and had his back broken, and he died before he could be taken to Manchester. He had been a driver for 18 years, and is described as being a steady, careful driver. The buffer beams of both engines were broken, and the buffers knocked off by the collision, which took place 180 yards inside the first and 200 yards outside the second or junction distant signal.

The collision was probably caused by the pointsman having taken off the first down distant signal before he ran back towards the junction, while the Middleton engine was still outside the junction distant signal, and which was thus left without any protecting signal behind it, except the light of the lamp behind, if it was still burning. Another man should have been available at the Middleton Junction for the performance of the signalman's duties. It cannot be considered as a part of the duties of a signalman at an important junction to be running upwards of a quarter of a mile from his post, holding points, and working other distant signals in order to cover shunting operations.

Again, an inspector should be present at the locomotive establishment at Miles Platting to see that all engines that leave are provided with the usual lights in front and rear, and that they are burning properly when they leave the station yard.

I am unable to say whether there was any light burning at the tail of the Middleton engine, as both lamps were smashed in the collision.

I have, &c.

W. YOLLAND,

Colonel.

*The Secretary of the
Railway Department,
Board of Trade.*

LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY.

*Board of Trade
(Railway Department),*

Whitehall, 17th April 1866.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Rich, R.E., the officer appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred at the New Cross station of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, on the 31st ultimo.

*The Secretary of the
London, Brighton, and
South Coast
Railway Company.*

I am, &c.
W. D. FANE.

*Board of Trade,
11th April 1866.*

SIR,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 5th April 1866, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 30th March 1866, at New Cross station of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway.

Numerous special trains were run on that day (which was Good Friday) between the Crystal Palace and London.

One of these special trains travelling from the Crystal Palace to London Bridge was drawn up at the platform of New Cross station about 11.22 p.m. Whilst it was standing there another special train, which left the Palace a few minutes before 11, and which had stopped at Sydenham and Forest Hill, stations, to set down passengers, ran into New Cross station and came into collision with it.

The train that was standing at the platform, consisted of an engine and tender, two guard's break vans (one of which was at the tail of the train) and eleven carriages.

The light at the tail of this train had gone out, between Forest Hill and New Cross stations, and the guard was in the act of renewing it when his train was run into.

The train that ran into the one standing at the station, consisted of an engine and tender and 11 carriages. Two of these carriages had break compartments with guards in them, one guard being in the carriage next to the tender and the other in the carriage at the tail of the train. As this train approached New Cross station, the auxiliary as well as the station, signal were at danger. Under these circumstances it was the duty of the driver, to pull up outside the station, and not to enter the station, till he had received a signal to do so.

The driver of this second train, admits that he observed that both the auxiliary and station signals were at danger, and he states, that he pulled up, or very nearly so, outside the station, but that when he got within 100 yards of the platform, he looked forward, and believing that there was no train standing at the platform, he allowed his train to run slowly in.

The approach to New Cross station from the south is on a falling gradient of 1 in 100, which changes to a level gradient at the over bridge at the south end of the platform.

Owing to the lamp at the tail of the train which was standing at the platform having gone out, the driver of the second train did not perceive his mistake, till they got within 18 or 20 yards of the standing train.

The first thing that he noticed, was the reflection of a white light on the back of the van. He reversed his engine, put on steam, and desired his fireman to apply his break, but he could not prevent his engine,