

then lowered both the distant and junction signals for the 2 h. 5 m. p.m. down express train to pass through the station. Subsequently he saw the station master give a signal for the 1 h. 40 m. p.m. train to leave, and then he put on both the distant and junction signals to "danger," but could not state whether the 2 h. 5 m. express train had passed the distant signal when he turned it on. He saw the steam from the engine, but he could not see the engine itself, and he noticed both trains approaching the junction, the 1 h. 40 m. moving very slow, and these two trains came into collision with each other just as the goods train on the up line was moving under the bridge into the station yard in the opposite direction.

The 2 h. 5 m. p.m. down express train consisted of engine, two first class and one second class carriage, and one van. It received a "caution" signal as it passed Bolton station, $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Wigan, and a "danger" signal as it passed Hindley, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Wigan, so that the driver says he almost pulled up, and then the "danger" signal was turned off, which indicated that the previous train had passed five minutes before, and that when he got in sight of the Wigan distant signal, worked from the eastern end of the Wigan station, but in obedience to the instructions of the signalman at the junction signal box, it stood at danger against him, and he sounded the engine whistle and it was taken off. He then proceeded, he says, cautiously down towards Wigan station, and when he entered the station yard the 1 h. 40 m. train was standing alongside of the down platform, at which time he thinks he was not running more than eight miles an hour, and when he was within about three carriage lengths of the other engine he saw that that train was moving. He then whistled for the breaks and did all in his power to stop.

The two engines came into contact with each other just before reaching the over bridge; both were thrown off the rails, and the engine of the express train then came in contact with the waggons of the goods train and knocked two of them off the rails. This engine was then diverted to the left and got partly through the bridge.

The express engine was a good deal but the other engine not much damaged. The sides of the carriages and van of the express train were damaged, but very little injury was done to the carriages in the 1 h. 40 m. p.m. train.

The collision was evidently occasioned by the mistake of the Wigan station master, and the absence of a signal to be worked from the junction signal box to control the departure of a train from the platform at the moment when a through non-stopping train is due to pass through the station, so that the junction signal was actually a signal for both trains to proceed. No blame appears to attach to any other servant of the company.

I had occasion some five years since, when reporting upon a collision at this same station, to make some suggestions as to the arrangements at this junction. These have been partially carried out in concentrating the working of the points and signals by one signalman with the locking apparatus instead of dividing the responsibility between two. But the position of the signal box close to the wing wall is still very far from being a good one, in consequence of the over bridge carrying the London and North-western Railway interfering with the view of the station yard from the signal box.

I believe there are several stations on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway where the platforms are alongside of sidings, and where there are main lines along which through trains pass without stopping at those stations. Similar collisions to this one may happen at any of these stations from the absence of platform signals in addition to the usual station signals that properly apply only to the main lines. I think it very desirable that the attention of the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway should be drawn to this matter.

I have, &c.

W. YOLLAND,
Colonel.

The Secretary
Board of Trade,
Whitehall.

SIR,

Manchester, 10th August 1865.

I HAVE submitted to the Directors of this Company your communication of 2nd August instant, handing copy of Colonel Yolland's Report on the collision at Wigan station on 20th June last, and beg to inform you that the Directors have ordered the recommendations therein contained to be carried into effect.

Yours obediently,

WM. S. LAWN,
Secretary.

The Secretary
Board of Trade,
Whitehall.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade
(Railway Department),

SIR, *Whitehall, 15th August 1865.*

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the report made by Colonel Yolland, the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred near Radcliffe Bridge on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, on the 1st instant, between a passenger train and an engine, and to request that in laying the same before the Directors you will more particularly call their attention to the concluding paragraph of the report, in which Colonel Yolland states it to be his opinion that the propelling of trains up inclines by means of an engine behind is most objectionable.

I am, &c.

W. D. FANE.

The Secretary of the
Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway Company.

SIR,

Whitehall, 14th August 1865.

I HAVE the honour to state for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, in obedience to your minute of the 3rd instant, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended a collision that occurred between Bury and Radcliffe Bridge on the East Lancashire Section of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway on the 1st instant, when 17 passengers sustained injuries, but it is hoped that none of the injuries will prove very severe.

It appears that when the 10.0 a.m. train from Accrington to Manchester reached Baxenden, the driver of the train heard a noise beneath the engine which caused him to think there was something wrong, and he sounded the whistle for the guard's breaks and stopped the train. On getting under the engine he found that either the driving wheel or the sweep of the crank axle had caught the buckle of the inside bearing spring and swept it from the centre towards the end of the top plate, and he took off the whole of the plates of that spring which were

loose and laid them on the foot plate of the engine, and proceeded on his journey, as he considered that the engine was then in a fit state to go on. When he got to Ramsbottom Station he again examined the engine and found that it was all right, and he did the same at Bury with a similar result. He left the plates of the inside bearing spring at Bury, and desired that another engine might be got ready for him for another train at 2.0 p.m. in place of the engine he was then driving, so that the inside bearing spring might be repaired.

This train, which then consisted of engine and tender and 11 vehicles, including 2 breaks with 2 guards in them, left Bury for Manchester at 10.54 a.m., or 14 minutes late, and when it had got about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Bury and was travelling it is said at the rate of 30 miles an hour, the driver again heard a noise beneath the engine, and he once more sounded the whistle for the guards' breaks and proceeded to stop the train, and had just if not quite brought it to a stand still, when it was overtaken and run into by an engine with a goods heavy break van behind it, which was following this train from Bury to Radcliffe Bridge for the express purpose of assisting it up the incline of 1 in 120, of about half a mile in length from Radcliffe Bridge to Ringley. The shock is admitted to have been a smart one, although no vehicle was thrown off the rails; but the last carriage, a new first-class, was a good deal damaged, and a second-class carriage in front of it had the body shifted on its frame. The driver (Snape) of the following engine thinks he was running 20 miles an hour when the collision took place, but judging from the effects on the carriages of the passenger train, I believe that he must have over estimated the rate at which he was travelling.

I must now explain how it happened that this engine followed the passenger train so closely. The East Lancashire Section of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway not long since lost its locomotive superintendent, and the present superintendent who was then new to the duties and work on the line, gave the following written order on the 26th June to an engine driver of the name of Samuel Ramsbottom, who was temporarily in charge of the Zamiel engine, in consequence of the regular driver of that engine being away from his work on account of illness.

" Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway,
" Locomotive Department,
" Bury, Lancashire,
" June 26th, 1865.

" SAMUEL RAMSBOTTOM, Engineman.

" TAKE Notice that tomorrow (Tuesday) the 27th inst. you will have to bank up the train leaving Bury at 10.40 a.m. from Radcliffe to Ringley with engine Zamiel.

" Yours, &c.

" J. JACQUES,
L. C."

" Acknowledge receipt.

I should also explain that Tuesday is market day, and this particular train is on that day in the week heavier than usual. The engine driver Ramsbottom understood by this order that he was to follow the passenger train from Bury to Radcliffe Bridge, where it is appointed to stop, and then to assist it up the

incline to Ringley, instead of proceeding to his regular work between Radcliffe Bridge and Ringley, and at the proper hour on the 27th June to assist the passenger train from Radcliffe Bridge up the incline. He also understood the order to be a prospective one for each succeeding Tuesday, although it is difficult to comprehend how it could be so interpreted. During the three succeeding weeks he was not working the Zamiel engine on the Tuesday, but the fireman remained with her, and in consequence the same engine followed the 10.40 a.m. passenger train from Bury to Radcliffe Bridge, and from thence up the incline behind the passenger train. On Tuesday the 25th July, Ramsbottom was again in charge of the Zamiel engine and he did as before; and on the 31st July, the regular driver of the engine (Snape) returned to his duty, and on the following morning he was told, both by his fireman and by Ramsbottom, what he was to do; and he proceeded to do it, with the result, a collision, which I have already described.

The driver (Snape) of the Zamiel engine complains that he was not told before he left Bury that something had been found wrong with the train engine at Baxenden, and that the plates of one of the springs had been left at Bury Station. It is quite certain that he did not expect that the passenger train would be stopped before it reached Radcliffe Bridge, 3 miles from Bury, and I think equally clear that he was not keeping a good look out ahead. He says that he followed the passenger train all the way and kept losing ground so that he might be 150 yards behind it when it passed under an overbridge where the driver of the passenger train began to stop his train, and at this point or near it he lost sight of the passenger train; but it is certain that at this particular spot the train in front could be seen from the following engine for a distance of more than 300 yards, and if he had been keeping a sharp look out and was not running, as he states, more than 25 miles an hour, he need have had no difficulty in pulling up with a break on the tender and a heavy goods break behind, without coming into collision with the passenger train.

The collision was evidently caused by the driver's neglect, but the fact is, that the engine should not have been permitted to follow the passenger train from Bury to Radcliffe Bridge at all, much less for 6 consecutive weeks, neither should such an order as I have quoted have been given at all, except in compliance with a requisition from the traffic superintendent, who was actually in the train on the day of the accident, and did not know that any engine had been detailed to assist the passenger train up the incline from Radcliffe to Ringley. Indeed it is very doubtful whether it was required at all on any of those days.

I have only to add that the propelling of trains up inclines by means of an engine behind is in my opinion most objectionable, and almost certain in the event of any mishap occurring to a vehicle in the front part of the train, largely to increase the danger to the passengers.

I have, &c.

W. YOLLAND,
Colonel.

The Secretary
Board of Trade,
Whitehall.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade
(Railway Department),
Whitehall, 21st October 1865.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council of Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the report made by Capt. Tyler, R.E., the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred on the 25th September between a passenger train and a coal train at Miles Platting, and to request

that, in laying this report before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, you will call their attention to the suggestions made by the inspecting officer relative to the mode of working the Miles Platting incline.

I am, &c.

The Secretary of the
Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway Company.

W. D. FANE.