

deavoured, but unsuccessfully, to prevent the deceased from crossing, and the particular duty he had to perform can only be allotted to one man.

I should, however, remark, that the present position of the gates across the highway is objectionable; they should be placed contiguous to the up and down lines, so as to close the road and the rails alternately, and thus give the policeman a better means of preventing persons from crossing when a train is expected to arrive or to pass without stopping.

I enclose a statement of the daily traffic along the road and across the railway for the period of one week, which the company have had taken at my request, together with a tracing showing the station.

I have, &c.

Captain Galton, R.E.,  
&c.

W. YOLLAND,  
Lt.-Colonel, R.E.

STATEMENT of the NUMBER of PASSENGERS, &c. crossing the Line at HELE. Week ending 27th June 1858.

June.		Crossing from Bradninch Gate.		Crossing from Broadclist Gate.		Total.	
		Passengers.	Vehicles.	Passengers.	Vehicles.	Passengers.	Vehicles.
21st	Monday - -	119	26	90	27	199	53
22nd	Tuesday - -	118	20	73	15	194	35
23rd	Wednesday - -	70	25	56	17	126	42
24th	Thursday - -	78	23	56	13	134	36
25th	Friday - -	79	15	45	21	127	36
26th	Saturday - -	86	18	45	12	123	30
27th	Sunday - -	106	6	63	7	174	13
	TOTAL - -	654	136	428	111	*1,082	247

\* This number includes 83 persons passing on horses.

WM. HARWOOD,  
Secretary to the Bristol and Exeter  
Railway Company.

### CHESTER AND HOLYHEAD RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, July 12, 1858.

SIR, I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that, in compliance with your instructions of the 25th ult., I have inquired into the circumstances which attended an accident to a passenger train on the 21st June, on the Chester and Holyhead Railway, about six miles from Chester.

The up mail train on that day left Flint 5 minutes late, at 12h. 45m.

It was composed as follows :—

Engine and tender.	3 first-class carriages.
Dummy van.	Guards van.
Composite carriage.	Horse box.
2 second-class carriages.	2 carriage trucks.

It left the rails, happily with injury to none but one passenger, at a newly ballasted under bridge about a mile and a quarter beyond Queensferry, the engine running about 170 yards, tearing up the rails and injuring the sleepers, but keeping its position on its wheels, and the carriages their original order, but all off the line.

The bridge is known as Sandycroft Bridge, and the work that had been going on had been the substitution of a stone culvert for a timber pile bridge.

The masonry had been completed seven weeks previously, and left to consolidate, and on the day preceding the accident (Sunday) arrangements had been made for keeping the line clear, for replacing the timber superstructure by ballast 2 ft. 6 in. deep, and for relaying the rails, and this had been effected by 6 p.m. on Sunday evening.

A signal man was in attendance all that day, by order, at an adjacent crossing, with instructions to "signal, if required to do so;" but the road was considered by the overlooker of permanent way, who superintended the work, as so safe, that he did not desire the caution signal to be shown, and the two Sunday evening passenger trains passed over it, the down train at a speed of, it is said, 30 to 40 miles an hour, and the up train, on the engine of which the overlooker himself returned from Queensferry to Chester, at about 25 miles an hour.

The overlooker left directions with the foreman of platelayers to be in attendance at the spot next morning, and to watch the new road, "to see that it was

"all right, and to give signal if anything wrong required to be put to rights;" but the latter saw nothing to make him deem it unsafe till the mail train went off the rails at about 1 p.m. on Monday.

The engine driver had been 13 years employed on the line.

The speed, he thought, might have been 35 to 40 miles an hour.

From Queensferry there is an incline for 1,100 yards of 1 in 132 towards Sandycroft, and then a straight level road for about a couple of miles; and the guard admitted that it was a part of the line on which it was usual to make play, and that on it the speed was never less than probably 40 miles an hour.

By the time table the distance from Flint to Chester should be traversed at the rate of about 28 miles an hour.

On the whole, it would appear that the train was travelling at its usual speed on that part of the line.

The station master at Queensferry and the signal man at Sandycroft concurred in their evidence on this point; and it would seem that the train was a little behind the time at which it generally passes those places, which would correspond with its having been five minutes late in leaving Flint.

The engine has only been running 12 months; it has 6-foot driving wheels, outside cylinders 15 inches diameter and 24 inches stroke, and is said to be remarkably steady in its motion.

I consider, therefore, that the cause of the accident was the sudden change in elasticity from newly laid ballast 2 feet 6 inches deep to a consolidated roadway, and that this sufficed to throw the fast train in question off the rails, when trains at more moderate speeds had passed the spot safely.

The overlooker was certainly in error in not causing the signal of caution to be shown. The road under his care seems in good order, and as he is alive to the importance of its being so, it may be hoped that for the future he will have less confidence in its stability, when by any alteration or renewal its strength is impaired.

I have, &c.

Captain Galton, R.E.,  
&c.

GEORGE ROSS,  
Captain, R.E.

### LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, July 14, 1858.

SIR, In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour

to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 15th ultimo, at the

Wigan Station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

On the day in question, the 7<sup>15</sup> a.m. train from Liverpool reached Wigan at 7<sup>55</sup> on its way to Manchester. It consisted of an engine and tender, six carriages, and a break van; and as soon as it arrived at the station the engine and tender were detached, according to the usual custom, from the train, and taken forward into a siding 60 or 70 yards distant, while a passenger carriage, which had arrived with another train from Southport, was run back and coupled on in front of the train, in readiness to proceed with it to Manchester. The Southport carriage having been thus run back and coupled on to the train, the pointsman on duty at the points leading to the siding signalled to the driver to run back to it with his engine.

When the driver first arrived in the siding, he directed his fireman to put some tallow in the cylinders of his engine, and, seeing that some of his tubes were nearly stopped up, he took the tube-rod himself for the purpose of cleaning them out. He had cleaned all but two when the pointsman signalled him back to the train; but upon receiving that summons he opened his regulator, and handed over the handle of it to his fireman, telling him to proceed gently to the platform, while he finished cleaning out the other two tubes.

The fireman, however, in endeavouring to shut the regulator again, when he thought that it was time for him to do so, turned the handle the wrong way, and pulled it still further open, instead of pushing it to. The driver was stooping at this time with his knee on the foot-plate, working his tube-rod, when he suddenly felt the engine give a spring forward. He looked up, and seeing that the regulator was wide open, he shut it in an instant from his kneeling position. He then endeavoured to reverse his engine as quickly as he could, but he slipped as he was getting up, and was only able to push the reversing lever two notches forward, when a collision occurred between his engine and his train, which was the more violent in consequence of the engine having been travelling at the time down a gradient of 1 in 90, and which is

stated to have taken place when the engine was travelling at a speed somewhere between 5 and 10 miles an hour.

Nine people were unfortunately hurt, some of them, probably, as they were getting into the carriages, but none seriously.

The driver is a steady man of good character, and five years' service, as a driver, with this company; and although he is culpable, as being responsible for the movements of his engine, for not having directed them himself, and either left it to the fireman to finish cleaning out the tubes, or else completed that duty before he left the siding; yet this is a case in which he has been the means of causing an accident through a little over anxiety to get through his work, and for which a comparatively lenient punishment may probably be considered sufficient.

The fireman is an intelligent lad of rather less than 19 years of age, who has been a regular fireman for four months, has been acting as extra fireman for nearly two years, and has been in the service of the company, and about the shops, for five or six years. He had only been for a week with this driver, and he made a pure mistake, from not having been long habituated to the engine, which, though accidental, was likely to lead to serious consequences, and which must be considered, therefore, as a piece of carelessness which should be visited with a moderate punishment.

The two sides of the engine where the regulator handle worked, were marked, respectively, "open," and "shut;" but the fireman probably could not have seen these indications, from *his* position, at the moment that he was working the regulator.

At present these regulator handles work differently on different engines, and this accident is a strong proof of the importance of uniformity, because if the fireman had been always accustomed to work them in the same direction, he could hardly by any possibility have made the mistake which produced it.

I have, &c.

*The Secretary,  
Railway Department,  
Board of Trade.*

H. W. TYLER,  
Captain, R.E.

#### MANCHESTER, SHEFFIELD, AND LINCOLNSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, June 15, 1858.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the report which they have received from Lieut.-Colonel Yolland, R.E., of his inquiry into the circumstances attending the accident which occurred on the 28th ultimo to a goods train at the Hyde terminus of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway.

My Lords trust that it is not the habitual practice on the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway for orders respecting an alteration in the duties of the servants of the company to be conveyed to them by means of verbal instructions, as indicated by the message which the signalman at the Hyde junction supposed he had received from the fireman of a passing train. Should such a course be practised on the railway, my Lords trust that the directors will take immediate steps to alter it, and to cause all instructions of this nature to be given in writing.

My Lords direct me to observe, that it appears very desirable that all trains on branch lines should be distinguished from trains for main lines by being furnished with a different signal by day and lamp by night, as is the practice on many other railways.

My Lords trust also that the inspecting officer's remarks upon the length of time the signalman is on duty, and the responsible position he occupies in comparison with the porters, paid equally as well as himself, will receive the careful consideration of the directors.

My Lords direct me also to call attention to the fact that had the guard of this train possessed a means of attracting the attention of the engine driver, this accident would probably not have occurred.

I am, &c.

DOUGLAS GALTON,  
Captain, R.E.

*The Secretary to the  
Manchester, Sheffield, and  
Lincolnshire Railway Company.*

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, June 9, 1858.*

SIR,

In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended an accident to a goods train on the 28th ultimo, at the Hyde terminus of the Hyde branch of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway, by which the engine driver lost his life.

This branch was first opened to the public, without their Lordships' sanction, about the 1st of last March, but it was subsequently inspected by an officer of the department early in May; was shortly afterwards closed to the public in consequence of the incompleteness of the works; and was finally opened with their Lordships' sanction on the 26th ultimo.

From the time when the line was first opened in March, the signalman stationed at the junction of